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SENATOR LEE M ETCALF

In Favor of the Equal Rights Amendment
The Senator tells why he supports
a Constitutional Amendment
Women are discriminated against in the labor
market, in marriage settlements, in the criminal
courts, in opportunities as citizens. They are
underpaid, denied the privilege of managing
their property, deprived of equal rights in many
activities. In this decade, when all men and
women of good will are concerned with justice
and equality, what are we going to do about it?
One approach would be for the various legis
latures in the fifty separate states to enact legis
lation granting equality to women. This is all
very well when we speak of the more enlight
ened states, and Montana is one, but there are
states whose legislators are medieval in their at
titude towards women’s rights, and in a few
such states, they probably would never achieve
equality.
The second approach would be for the United
States Supreme Court to hand down a broad
and landmark decision declaring that the Fifth
Amendment for federal action and the Four
teenth Amendment for state action prevent dis
crimination on the basis of sex. For many years
I have thought that the U.S. Supreme Court,
when confronted with the question, would hand
down a broad decision outlining the Constitu
tional necessity of providing equal rights and
equal opportunities for women. Certainly a
court that can find that a corporation is a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment could reach
a similar result in the case of women. A farreaching and landmark decision was reached
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). That ended the “separate but equal doc
trine” as it had been applied in segregation
cases. In that I concur. Why not such a decision

in one of the many cases involving women’s
rights?
But this has not happened. In each instance
the Supreme Court has decided the case before
it on the narrow issue. The most recent case is
from Idaho, Reed v. Reed, 40 LW 4013 (U.S.
November 22,1971). This case, along with other
recent Supreme Court decisions such as Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), and several
others, indicates that the Supreme Court is go
ing to decide narrow issues and it will take a
long course of litigation to achieve equality for
women. It will take a hundred years at the
present rate.
The third course is the Constitutional Amend
ment. This requires Congressional approval and
ratification of legislatures of three-fourths of
the states. However, since it would probably be
impossible to get adequate legislation in all fifty
states, and the Supreme Court has indicated
that it is not about to make any decisions that
will be universally effective, I am constrained to
support a Constitutional Amendment. The pas
sage of such an amendment would change the
burden of proof so that women would not have
to continue to come into court as the plaintiffs;
instead, those who insisted on variations would
have to justify the Constitutional differentia
tion.
Opponents of a Constitutional Amendment
suggest all sorts of scare ideas. The idea that all
people will be subject to the draft is one. That
is not bad. Women can do many jobs in the
military establishment, and already we have a
selection process wherein men are classified in
accordance with their fitness for combat service.
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As a former combat infantryman I know a good
many girls who would have been better on a
machine gun holding a flank than the men as
signed. Nevertheless, I rely on the judgment of
the men and women making assignments, even
as I rely on their good judgment now.
The same is true on the question of public rest
rooms, or special sexual policies.
I had hoped that women would be considered
as “persons” under the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments, that women would attain the

same judicial status as corporations. Apparently
this is not going to happen under the current
decisions of the Supreme Court. Many state leg
islatures are not going to acknowledge equal
rights for women. The only way that we are
going to achieve equality in the near future is
by a Constitutional Amendment. Therefore I
am in support of such an amendment. In addi
tion, if we pass an amendment for equality, it
will put an end to the controversy over the
length of boys’ hair.
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From the 1970 Census
Employment data
over the decade
As of April 1,1970, there were 248,342 persons
employed in Montana, a gain since 1960 of just
over 17,000 workers. All of the increase was due
to the larger number of working women. For
the second decade in a row, the number of men
employed in Montana declined and the number
of women increased substantially. The figures
for 1960 and 1970 look like this:
I960
Total em ploym ent -....... 231,270
M a l e _________
163,207
Fem ale ....................... 68,063

1970
248,342
161,654
86,688

Change
17,072
-1,553
18,625

These numbers reflect the movement out of
state of young males in the working age groups.
They go, of course, in search of jobs.
Changes in employment by industry will con
tain no surprises for readers of the Montana
Business Quarterly or the Montana Economic
Study. There were 12,272 fewer jobs in agricul
ture, mining, and transportation (i.e., railroads)
while the number of workers in trade, finance,
services, and public administration (govern
ment) increased by 24,386. Construction and
manufacturing showed little change.
The Census Bureau doesn’t use the usual in
dustrial classification in compiling its employ
ment data. Under public administration (that is,
government) it includes only postal service em

1960
Agriculture ............
40,832
M ining ..............
6,782
Construction ......
14,911
M a n u fa ctu rin g --------------- 23,451
Transportation and
public utilities ........
21,013
T r a d e ---------------------------- 47,094
Finance, insurance,
and real e s t a t e ------------- 8,035
S e r v ic e s ------------------------- 52,008
Public ad m in istration ___ 12,033
Industry not rep o rted ...... 5,111
T o t a l............................... 231,270

1970
31,794
5,689
14,983
23,411

Change
-9,038
-1,093
72
-40

18,872
53,071

-2,141
5,977

9,204
67,000
14,281
10,037
248,342

1,169
14,992
2,248
4^926
17,072

ployees and persons employed in federal, state,
and local administration. Public school teachers
and college professors are included in the serv
ice industries; other government employees are
assigned to the appropriate industry. When all
federal, state, and local government employees,
regardless of occupation, are combined, they
number approximately 51,000; one in five work
ers was on a federal, state, or local government
payroll in 1970.

There were 16,832 people unemployed as of
April 1, 1970, about the same number as in 1960.
In an area with large seasonal fluctuations in
unemployment, figures for any one month are
not necessarily typical of the experience for the
year.

Maxmc Johnson is Associate Professor in the School of Business Administration at the University of Montana
and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research. She is also President of the Association
ior University Business and Economic Research (AUBER).
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The 1970 Elections in the First Congressional
District of Montana
A look at voting patterns
in the last election

The race between incumbent Democratic
Congressman Arnold Olsen and Republican Mis
soula Mayor Richard G. (Dick) Shoup for the
office of United States Representative from the
First Congressional District of Montana must be
considered one of the curious political upsets in
Montana’s history as a state.

The District Vote
The off-year election turnout of 254,790 or
78.1 percent of those registered (shown in table
1) constitutes one of the lowest in the past dec
ade. After trailing by a margin of from 2,000 to
3,000 votes, Republican Shoup finally moved
Table 1
Percentage of Statewide Registered Voters Voting
1960-1970
Year
1960
1962
1964

Percent
Voting
86.7
77.9
85.9

Montana State U niversity Press, 1958), p. 288.
Year
1966
1968
1970

Percent
Voting
86.3
86.6..
78.1

Source: Secretary of State, Report of the O fficial Cai
vas of the Vote Cast at the General Election H eld in t)
State of Montana, N ovem ber 1960-1970 (Helena Moi
tana).
’

ahead of Olsen sixteen hours after the polls
closed to defeat the incumbent Congressman
with a total of 64,388 votes, 50.5 percent of the
ofr M oL Hn fa “

o :iaaS

127,563 total votes cast in the First Congres
sional District, as seen in table 2. Shoup carried
fourteen of the twenty-four counties in the
Western Congressional District. Such a victory
can hardly be described as a mandate, but the
darkhorse Republican won an election that few
save himself and his closest advisors considered
possible. Shoup had earlier defeated two pri
mary challengers, Tom Mongar of Missoula and
Tom Winsor of Bozeman, with 60.5 percent of
the vote, a plurality of 12,115 votes.1
No Republican had served in Congress from
the First District in twenty-eight years. Demo
crats had won twenty-three of the last twentysix elections. In the election of 1940, Jeannette
Rankin carried thirteen of the seventeen coun
ties, as the district was then constituted, to win
the congressional seat by a margin of 9,264
votes.2 In the 1942 election Mike Mansfield, a
Democrat, won the First District by carrying
eleven of the seventeen counties with a plural
ity of 14,151 votes.3
For a full discussion of the 1970 election throughout
the state see: Brad E. Hainsworth, “The 1970 Elections
m Montana,” W estern P olitical Q uarterly, Vol. XXIV.
No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 301-307.
Waldron, M ontana P olitics Since 1864 (Missoula:
t\/t1
‘ There w ere three contestants in this race.
Mansfield garnered 42,574 votes, Republican H. K.
aze aker received 28,603, and Socialist Lavem e
Hamilton received 1,058 votes. In 1944, Mansfield
again won the seat by a plurality of 30,867 votes; in

Science from 1968-71 at the Universit
<1 o ta u Assistant to the President at the W hite House.
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Table 2
Vote by County, First Congressional District. 1970
Democrat Olsen
Percentage
County
Vote
of Total
Beaverhead ---------------958
35.09
Broadwater ---------------487
42.76
D eer Lodge --------------- 3,696
67.72
F l a t h e a d ------------------- 5,928
44.39
Gallatin --------------------- 4,438
42.23
G la c ie r ---------------------- 1,728
52.54
Granite gg-----------------413
40.61
Jefferson ----874
51.90
Lake ------------------------- 2,069
39.02
Lewis & C la r k ----------- 5,996
46.76
L ib e r t y ---------------------440
42.93
L in c o ln ---------------------- 2,658
59.11
Madison ...-----------------956
42.13
Meagher --------285
36.45
M ineral -------------------586
53.86
M i s s o u la ------------------- 9,266
46.96
P a r k ------------------------- 2,100
45.08
Pondera --------------------- 1,397
52.22
P o w e l l ---------------------- 1,338
51.68
R a v a l l i -------------------- 2,369
41.81
S a n d e r s -------------------- 1,493
54.19
Silver B o w ---------------- 11,108
64.88
T e t o n --------------------------- 1,507
51.59
Toole ~ ~ ~ ------------- 1,085
43.80
Total ------------------ 63,175
Plurality -----------

Republican Shoup
Percentage
Vote
of Total
1,772
64.91
652
57.24
1,762
32.28
7,426
55.61
6,072
57.77
1,561
47.46
604
59.39
810
48.10
3,234
60.98
6,827
53.24
585
57.07
1,839
40.89
1,313
57.87
497
63.55
502
46.14
10,467
53.04
2,558
54.92
1,278
47.78
1,251
48.32
3,297
58.19
1,262
45.81
6,013
35.12
1,414
48.41
1,392
56.20

49.52

64,388
1,213

50.48

Total
Vote
2730
1*139
5458
13354
10510
3,289
1,017
1684
5303
12823
1*025
4,497
2269
782
1,088
19*733
4,’658
2675
2*589
5,666
2,755
17,121
2*921
2,477
127,563

Source: Secretary of State, R eport of th e O fficial Canvass of the Vote C ast at th e G eneral Election H eld in the
State of M ontana, N ovem ber 3, 1970 (Helena, M ontana).

Arnold Olsen, the Democrat defeated in 1970,
had served in the Congress since the 1960 elec
tion. He had, however, been a marginal candi
date, winning each election by less than 5
percent of the vote. In spite of this tenuous hold
on the First District, most political observers,
both in Montana and across the nation, felt that
Olsen would retain his position in the Congress.
Olsen was unchallenged in the primaries and
received a total of 40,676 votes.

Campaign Issues
Few issues developed during the First Dis
trict race, issues in the sense that there were
true alternatives offered by the two candidates.
1946, he received a plurality of 12,460; in 1948 he re
ceived a plurality of 34,339; and in 1950, he received
a plurality of 19,449 votes. In 1952, he sought and won
a seat in the United States Senate.

Olsen announced that he would run on his rec
ord and used as his campaign slogan, “Keep the
First District First.” Shoup claimed that he, too,
was going to run on Olsen’s record and used as
his campaign slogan, “Let’s Stop Fooling
Around.”
Olsen saw inflation, health and education,
withdrawal from Vietnam, crime in the streets,
and environment as the major issues of the cam
paign. In foreign affairs, Olsen adopted a mod
erate isolationist view. He argued for immediate
troop withdrawal from Vietnam and a lesser
role for the United States in Western Europe.
Shoup saw inflation as a major issue. He
pointed to lumber mill closures, shrinking pay
checks, and the rising cost of living as ample
evidence that it was time for a change in con
gressional representation. Problems surround
ing the environment were of concern to Shoup,
and he argued throughout the campaign for

Winter 1972

10

Brad E. Hainsworth

“strict but sensible” pollution controls. Shoup
favored the Nixon administration’s posture in
foreign affairs.
The significance of the 1970 election is diffi
cult to determine at this point. The counties
that have been the key to thirty years of Demo
cratic control of the First District are, of course,
Deer Lodge and Silver Bow Counties. The Dem
ocrats have relied on the bloc vote of labor in
these two mining counties. Silver Bow County
contains the huge open pit copper mine of The
Anaconda Company. The smelter is located at
Anaconda in adjoining Deer Lodge County.

The Significance of Silver Bow and
Deer Lodge Counties
The Butte-Anaconda area has been the vote
base of the political careers of the state’s two
Democratic Senators. Both Mike Mansfield and
Lee Metcalf served as Congressmen from the
First District. Mansfield held the seat from
1943 to 1953 and was then elected to the United
States Senate. Metcalf, who held the congres
sional seat from 1953 to 1961, followed Mans
field into the Senate leaving the seat open for
Olsen.4
Since the First and Second Districts were
created in 1918, Republicans have won the First
District seat only four times. In the Republican
landslide of 1920, W. J. McCormick won the
seat; in 1938, Dr. Jake Throkelson won the seat;
and in 1940, the Republicans retained the seat
with the election of Jeannette Rankin.
Some political observers argue that the po
tency of these two Democratic counties is de
clining. Figures from the recent population
census seem to substantiate this argument
(table 3). In 1960, the total population of these
two counties was 65,094; in 1970 their combined
population had declined to a total of 57,633.
That represents a loss for Deer Lodge County
of 16.0 percent and a 9.6 percent loss for Silver
Bow County. The loss for the two counties com
bined is 11.5 percent.
Although the loss is for population, not regis
tered voters, one can assume, of course, that it
was the Democratic party that suffered the loss
‘Other Senators have used the same route in this cen
tury. Thomas J. Walsh, Burton K. Wheeler, and James
E. Murray all claimed Deer Lodge and Silver Bow
Counties as their home base of political support.

Table 3
Population Trend in Deer Lodge and
Silver Bow Counties, 1960-1970
Total
County
1960
Deer Lodge ------- 18,640
Silver Bow ........ 46,454
T o t a l ------------- 65,094

Population
1970
Loss
15,652 2,988
41,981
4,473
57,633

7,461

Percent
Change
1960-1970
-16.0 1
- 9.6
-11.5 \

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen- I
sus, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, N um ber of In-']
habitants, Montana, P C (1)-A 28 (W ashington, D.C.: j
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), table 9, p. j
28-12.

politically. A glimpse at the voting returns for
both counties tends to support this thesis (table
4). Although percentages of Democratic and
Republican votes held relatively constant, the
Democrats saw their plurality diminished by
1,415 votes in a ten-year period. In 1960, the
total Democratic vote for Congressman was
18,247 or 65.05 percent of the vote. In 1970,
14,804 Democratic votes were cast. They accounted for 65.57 percent of the total vote, but
with 3,443 fewer Democratic votes cast, their
clout in the First District as a whole had lessened.
At the same time, Republicans lost 2,028
votes. In view of this, and of the relatively con
stant percentage breakdown in party votes, it is
difficult to use Silver Bow and Deer Lodge
voting records to bolster Republican ambitions
for the future. This seems to indicate that the
outlook for Republican politics in the Western
Congressional District probably is better re
flected in the population trends and vote tabu
lations of other Western Montana counties.

bounties that Lost Population
For purposes of this paper, counties showing
a population variance from 1960 to 1970 of 15
percent or more will be considered as counties
wi significant political implication. Thirteen
out of twenty-four counties in the First Con
gressional District have experienced population
variances of 15 percent or more over the past
ten years.
Six counties showed a population loss in excess of 15 percent. The percentage loss in Silver
w County was only 9.6 percent, but the coun-
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Table 4
Vote for Congress in Deer Lodge and Silver Bow Counties, 1960-1970

1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960

D eer Lodge_______
Dem
Rep
V ote — ------------ 3,696
1,762
Percent ----------- 67.72
32.28
Total -------------5,458
V ote ---------------- 4,496
1,585
Percent ----------- 73.94
26.06
T o t a l -------------6,081
V o t e --------------- 4,060
1,889
P e r c e n t ----------- 68.25
31.75
Total -------------5,949
Vote* ----* 3,881
2,415
P e r c e n t ----------- 61.34
38.17
T o t a l -------------6,327
V o t e ---------------- 4,423
1,934
P e r c e n t ----------- 69.58
30.42
T o t a l -------- —
6,357
V ote --------- ---- 5,261
2,308
Percent .........
69.51
30.49
Total -------- • 7,569

Combined
Counties

Silver Bow
Dem
11,108
64.88

Rep
6,013
35.12

Dem
14,804
65.57

5,856
31.64

17,151
69.74

6,526
34.67

16,359
66.03

6,658
32.14

17,722
65.54

5,814
31.47

17,085
68.80

7,495
36.59

18,247
65.05

17,121
12,655
68.36

22,579

18,511
12,299
65.33

20,481

9,073
33.55
27,042

18,476
12,986
63.41

8,415
33.97
24,774

20,715
12,662
68.53

7,441
30.26
24,592

18,825
13,841
66.82

Rep
7,775
34.43

7,748
31.20
24,833
9,803
34.95
28,050

Source: Secretary of State, R eport of th e O fficial C anvas of th e Vote Cast at th e G eneral Election H eld in the
State of Montana, N ovem ber 1960-1970 (Helena, M ontana).
*In 1964, the National States Rights Party had a candidate on the ballot. He did not m ake a substantial showing
in either county.

ty’s significance in terms of size and political
orientation makes its inclusion mandatory. As
pointed out before, both Senator Mike Mans
field and Senator Lee Metcalf built their ca
reers on the Democratic vote in Silver Bow and
Deer Lodge Counties. In terms of demography
it also is appropriate to combine the two coun
ties.
Table 5
Counties Exceeding 15 Percent Decrease in Population
1960-1970
Population
County
1960
1970
Deer Lodge .................. 18,640
15,652
Meagher .....................
2,616
2,122
Park .........................
13,168
11,197
Silver Bow _______
46,454
41,981
Teton .....................
7,295 6,116
T o o l e ---------------------- 7,904
5,839

Percent
Change
-16.0
-18.9
-15.0
- 9.6
-16.2
-26.1

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen
sus, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, N um ber of In
habitants, M ontana, P C (1)-A 28 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), table 9, p.
28-12.

Since the 1965 redistricting of the congres
sional districts, the four new counties—Meagher,

Park, Teton, and Toole—have mainly voted Re
publican; but all four lost population between
1960 and 1970.
Meagher County has gone Republican in con
gressional races by a vote in excess of 60 per
cent, although this margin has fallen in the last
three elections. During the past decade the
county declined in population by 18.9 percent.
The county went for Republican Dick Smiley
in 1966 with 67.06 percent of the vote. In 1968,
Smiley won the county with 66.25 percent. Dick
Shoup won the county in 1970 with 63.55 per
cent of the vote, a decline of 3.51 percentage
points from 1966 (table 6). In spite of this dim
inution, Congressman Shoup can continue to
rely on Meagher County. Though its declining
number of Republican voters can be of little en
couragement, the county remains safely within
the Republican camp.
Park County dropped in population by 15 per
cent between 1960 and 1970. It has consistently
voted Republican. Shoup carried Park County
by 54.92 percent. In 1966, the Republicans car
ried the county by 56.85 percent, which placed
it inside the Republican camp. In 1968, however,
Republican support dropped to 51.86 percent,
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Table 6
Vote for Congress in Counties Showing Significant Population Loss. 1960-1970
Meagher

_______ Park________
Teton
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
2,100
2,558
1,507
1,414
45.08
54.92
51.59
48.41
782
4,658
2,921
577
2,574
2,773
1,487
1,591
66.25
48.14
51.86
48.31
51.69
871
5»347
3,078
570
2,102
2,769
1,504
1,527
67.06
43.15
56.85
49.62
50.38
850
4,871
3,031
Source: Secretary of State, R eport of the Official Canvas of the Vote Cast at the G eneral
State of Montana, N ovem ber 1960-1970 (Helena, Montana).
Dem
1970 Vote ____ 285
Percent „ 36.45
Total ___
1968 Vote ____ 294
Percent .. 33.75
Total ___
1966 Vote __ ...
280
Percent ~ 32.94
T o t a l ___

Rep
497
63.55

making it a possible swing county. Shoup’s vic
tory probably did not bring the county perma
nently back into a safe tally of 55 percent or
more. The Democrats will undoubtedly con
tinue to consider Park County a possible swing
area.
Teton County went Republican by very nar
row margins in 1966 and 1968. Shoup lost
the county in 1970 by a narrow margin of 93
votes out of 2,921 votes cast, a difference of 3.18
percentage points. As a result of the 1970 de
cennial census, Teton County will be placed
back in the Second Congressional District.
Shoup undoubtedly looks upon this redistrict
ing loss as a gain for him.
Toole County lost 26.1 percent of its popula
tion over the past ten years. It has, however,
shown an increasing degree of Republican
strength. Shoup won the county by 56.20 per
cent. This margin places the county within the
Republican camp for 1972.
The meaning of it all: status quo ante. Coun
ties with declining populations will probably
continue to decline, though voter ratios will
probably remain somewhat constant. Little can
as yet be seen in the activities of the two parties
which will change things appreciably by No
vember 1972.

Counties that Gained Population
Although it is fascinating to speculate on the
future of GOP politics in the Western Congres
sional District, an analysis of those counties in
the district showing significant population gains
does not offer much specific evidence for crystal
ball gazing.

Toole
Dem
1,085
43.80

Rep ' 9
1,392 |
56.20
2,477

1,231
45.83

1,455
57.17
2,686

1,337
49.68

1,354
50.32
2,691

Election H eld in the

Seven counties in the Western District have
registered population gains in excess of 15 per
cent (table 7). A brief resume of the voter re
turns of each county sheds little light on the
political future of either party.
Ironically, Republicans cannot look to one of
their old strongholds, Gallatin County, as an
area of increasing Republican strength. Galla
tin County is one of the more rapidly growing
urban areas of the state. Its population in
creased from 26,045 in 1960, to 32,505 in 1970,
giving the county a population increase of 24.8
percent in ten years. This is the third largest
growth rate among the more rapidly growing
counties in the district. This rapid increase,
however, cannot be interpreted as good news
Table 7
Counties Exceeding: 15 Percent Increase in Population
1960-1970
County
Flathead
Gallatin ...
Jefferson ..
Lewis & Clark
Lincoln* ..........
Missoula __
Ravalli .......

Population
I960
1970
32,965
39,460
26,045
32,505
4,297
5,238
28,006
33,281
12,537
18,063
44,663
58,263
12,341
14,409

Percent
Change
19.7
24.8
21.9
18.8
44.1
30.5
16.8

! ° rj\ D^ artme^ of Commerce, Bureau of the Cenhabitaft* C m SU1 °f PopuIatio7i; 1970, N um ber of ln U S G ovU
. PC ( 1) —
A.28 (Washington, D.C.:
2 8 -1 2 °
Dt Prmting ° ffice« 1970), table 9, p.
t

ih K ir

t%

“

ta u s e a D y the <
b e permanent.

Libby Dam and m ay not
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for either of the major political parties. In 1960,
the Republicans received 58.70 percent of the
1 vote. In 1970, they received 57.77 percent. This
is a loss of 0.93 percentage points (table 8). The
I vote ratio has fluctuated from a Republican low
I of 55.05 percent in 1964, to a high of 58.90 in
( 1962, a difference of 3.85 percentage points. The
, county will undoubtedly stay safely Republi
can, but it is questionable whether either party
can do much more to change the vote ratio in
this growing and populous county.
Shoup’s home county, Missoula, is another
area which can boast of significant growth. In
1960, Missoula’s population was 44,663, but over
the past ten years the county has experienced a
rapid growth rate of 30.5 percent, bringing the
county population in 1970 to 58,263. Shoup ad
mits disappointment at his performance in Mis
soula County. He need not, however, feel as
| though he personally had been discriminated
against because, again, the split between the
I two major parties remained comparatively con
stant. In 1960, the Republicans garnered 51.75
percent of the vote. In 1970, they received 53.04
percent, an increase of 1.29 percentage points.
Shoup brought in the largest Republican vote
for United States Representative the Republi
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cans have received in the past ten years. This
can probably be explained by his publicity
throughout the county while he served as
Mayor of the city of Missoula prior to running
for Congress. The Republicans lost the county
in 1964, 1966, and 1968, although they tallied
more than 45 percent of the vote each year. This
makes this large and important county a swing
county, and one of extreme importance to both
parties. The Democrats will need Missoula
County if they are to unseat Shoup, and one
may certainly assume that they are intent on
that end. If Shoup should lose Missoula in
1972, he will have lost the election unless he
makes substantial gains elsewhere.
Lewis and Clark is a county that stacked up
a significant increase of 18.8 percent in popula
tion. This growth resulted in a comparatively
significant increase in the Republican vote. In
1960, the Republicans received 48.52 percent of
the vote for Congressman. In 1970, the GOP
share of the vote increased to 53.24 percent, an
increase of 4.72 percentage points. In spite of
this increased margin, it still remains a swing
county. The only other year in the past decade
when the county went Republican was 1966.
Helena, the capital city of Montana, is located in

Table 8
Vote for Congress in Counties Showing Significant Population Growth, 1960-1970

1970 Vote ..
Percent _
Total .......
1968 Vote __
Percent ....
Total ___
1966 Vote Percent ....
Total ........
1964 Vote*
Percent _
Total ___
1962 Vote ..
Percent ...
Total ____
1960 Vote
Percent ...
Total ___

Gallatin
Dem
Rep
4,438
6,072
42.23
57.77
10,510
5,149
6,591
43.86
56.14
11,740
4,470
5,923
43.01
56.99
10,393
4,933
6,077
44.68
55.05
11,040
3,776
5,411
41.10
58.90
9,187
4,334
6,160
41.30
58.70
10,494

Lewis & Clark
Dem
Rep
5,996
6,827
46.76
53.24
12,823
6,853
6,802
50.19
49.81
13,655
6,218
6,846
47.60
52.40
13,064
7,207
6,176
53.60
45.94
13,445
5,988
5,734
51.08
48.92
11,722
6,748
6,361
51.48
48.52
13,109

Missoula
Dem
Rep
9,266 10,467
46.96
53.04
19,733
11,407
9,790
53.81
46.19
21,197
9,984
9,541
51.13
48.87
19,525
11,052 10,062
52.12
47.45
21,206
7,905
8,663
47.71
52.29
16,568
9,287
9,960
48.25
51.75
19,247

Ravalli
Dem
Rep
2,369
3,297
41.81
58.19
5,666
2,646
3,308
44.44
55.56
5,954
2,225
3,207
40.96
59.04
5,432
2,640
2,910
47.37
52.22
5,573
2,381
2,576
48.03
51.97
4,957
2,571
3,027
45.93
54.07
5,598

Flathead
Dem
Rep
5,928
7,426
44.39
55.61
13,354
7,673
7,074
52.03
47.97
14,747
6,586
7,297
47.44
52.56
13,883
7,413
7,090
50.84
48.62
14,582
6,222
6,503
48.90
51.10
12,725
7,359
7,056
51.05
48.95
14,415

Jefferson
Dem
Rep
874
810
51.90 48.10
1,684
996
769
56.43
43.57
1,765
832
768
52.00 48.00
1,600
855
795
51.44
47.83
1,662
785
764
50.68 49.32
1,549
886
748
54.22 45.78
1,634

Source: Secretary of State, R eport of the O fficial Canvas of the Vote Cast at th e G eneral Election H eld in th e
State of M ontana, N ovem ber 1960-1970 (Helena, Montana).
*In 1964, the National States Rights Party had a candidate on the ballot. He did not m ake a substantial showing
m any county.
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Lewis and Clark County. The gubernatorial
race may have a substantial effect on the Demo
cratic turnout in 1972. Incumbent Democrats
in the present administration of Governor For
rest Anderson have a vested interest in the out
come of that election, and Lt. Governor Thomas
Judge has announced his candidacy.
Ravalli County has consistently gone Repub
lican in House races every election during the
past ten years. In the 1960 congressional race,
the Republicans received 54.07 percent. Shoup
received 58.19 percent in 1970. That represents
an increase of 4.12 percentage points for the tenyear period. Ravalli County is clearly GOP ter
ritory.
Jefferson County is significant only because
of its rapid increase in population. It jumped in
population from 4,297 in 1960, to 5,238 in 1970,
an increase of 21.9 percent. It has, however,
been a Democratic county for the past ten years!
Shoup garnered only 48.10 percent of the 1970
vote. Clearly, he cannot look to this county for
added strength.
Flathead County has also shown significant
growth, increasing from a population of 32,965
in 1960, to 39,460 in 1970, a growth of 19.7 per
cent. Shoup carried Flathead by a fairly
healthy 55.61 percent, and the county may be a
source of future strength, even though the Dem
ocrats carried this county by unsteady margins
in 1960, 1964, and 1968. Shoup won the health
iest margin for Republicans in this county in
the past ten years. Flathead remains, how
ever, a swing county and it is not unlikely that
Shoup’s margin will sag or even reverse itself.
The meaning of it all: status quo ante. Each
of the growing counties discussed here, with the
possible exceptions of Gallatin and Ravalli, has
been a marginal county politically. Each has
vacillated in its election returns during the past
ten years with maximum predictability.

The Outlook for 1972
What all of this means is that it remains any
one’s guess as to how the Western District will
go in 1972. The district has clearly been Demo
crat territory so far as congressional elections
go, and if Shoup and the Republican party in
tend to keep the First Congressional seat, they
are going to have to conduct a well-financed,
well-organized, and smartly executed campaign!
Several other factors present themselves at

this point Congressman Shoup will undoubtedly
be the recipient of the sympathy vote that a
one-term candidate usually gets. The word goes
around that after all he has only one short term
and should, therefore, be given a chance to
prove himself. Whether such a phenomenon
will improve Shoup’s chances for increasing his
margin is uncertain. This was probably a fac
tor in freshman Congressman John Melcher’s
surprisingly good showing in the Second Con
gressional District in 1970.
Second, the Republican success of 1970 will
have a reinforcing effect on the voter with Re
publican loyalties. Having tasted success for
the first time in the First Congressional District
in many years, party workers will be doubly de
termined to retain the seat. It is highly unlikely
that Shoup will be confronted with any primary
contest. Such a contender would find himself
very unpopular with harried Republican stal
warts trying to keep the party united in what
promises to be a very difficult year.
Third, for the Democrats there is the other
side of the coin: after seeing what an effective
Republican campaign can do, they will surely
double their efforts to retake “their” congres
sional seat. They will also be aware of the fact
that the best organized Republican campaign in
years only netted a victory of 1,213 votes. Such a
margin must represent a truly tantalizing ehaSl
lenge.
Fourth, Olsen’s announcement that he intends |
to run for Congress again is probably meant to
discourage future primary challengers, and talk
has it that he will receive the endorsement of
r i 5^ u ZeC* ^a^or* ^ this is true, there is little j
likelihood of a successful primary challenge by I
other hopefuls such as State Senator Luke Me- j
eon.* Such a primary contest could only serve I
to split the Democrats before the November .
general election.
Fifth, the recent Democratic gains in the con-1
*.e?fSii or
Constitutional Convention have 3
left the state GOP at its lowest ebb. What this!
Democratic margin in the Convention portends \
lor the 1972 elections is difficult to say; how
ever, it has shown the Republicans the consider- j
that
The December 4 Missoulian report
S r i n w S 6! D®nloclratic “hopeful,” former State S
over
1 .K-fv+Sch0°ls> Harriet Miller, is thinki:
rare fer
entering the Democratic prima
race for the First District seat.
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ible vitality in the opposition’s camp and may
be indicative of Democratic momentum that
::ould run through next fall’s elections.
A sixth factor is the expanded ballot and all
ts attendant dangers and problems. The ticket
vill include candidates running for the Presi
dency, the seat of Senator Metcalf, and the
Governor’s chair among others, in addition to
he congressional race. This means that for
:ach party, funds and workers will be spread
nuch more thinly during the 1972 election than
luring an off year.
Seventh, for the congressional candidates,
)ut of the thirteen counties in the First Con
gressional District considered in this paper, at
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least half of them must be considered swing
counties. Their vote ratio can vary from as
much as 45 to 55 percent. This means that with
proper organization and timely execution, the
District could go to that party which presents
the most attractive candidate, regardless of
party.
A final factor is the position of incumbency.
Shoup has the advantages and trappings of of
fice. His position gives him an increased visibil
ity that any challenger would find difficult to
match. There is, however one sobering caveat
here: Arnold Olsen was an incumbent, a fiveterm incumbent, when he lost in 1970.

f
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A Summary of the Revenue Act of 1971
Some key provisions
of the new tax law
The Revenue Act of 1971 was signed into law
by President Nixon on December 10, 1971. The
Act, which is estimated to cut taxes by $15.7
billion over a three-year period is another ex
ample of the continuing use of our tax laws to
achieve economic goals.
The economic atmosphere in 1971 when the
administration proposed “New Economic Pol
icies,” was one of high unemployment, rising
prices, a deteriorating balance of payments posi
tion, and an abnormally low rate of capital
spending.
The Ways and Means Committee of the House
of Representatives sought a tax relief program
that was not only fair to both individuals and
businesses, but would also stimulate consump
tion by individuals and capital investment by
businesses.
The House Ways and Means Committee Re
port that accompanied the Revenue Act of 1971
set forth the objectives of the Act. As stated in
the report, they are:
1. To put our present lagging economy on the
high growth path.
2. To increase the number of jobs and dimin
ish the high unemployment rate.
3. To relieve the hardships imposed by infla
tion on those with modest incomes.
4. To provide a rational system of tax incen

tives to aid in the modernization of our
productive facilities.
5. To increase our exports and improve our
balance of payments.

The Committee believed these objectives
could be attained with the enactment of this bill
and with the coordination of other governmen
tal actions, including the present wage-price
freeze and the commitment of the administra
tion to reduce government spending.
The provisions of the 1971 Revenue Act which
will help attain these objectives are as follows:
1.
A 7 percent investment credit was rein
stated. The credit is generally effective on
August 15, although it is also effective with
respect to earlier deliveries where orders were
placed after the end of March, but delivered
before August 15.
/ A*TYD^*nec* witk ^ e Asset Depreciation Range
(ADR) system, the investment credit is esti
mated to provide businesses that expand and
modernize their equipment with from $1.5 bilmrri971 to
billion in tax reductions in
iyJ. Th? modification in the ADR system is
estimated to forestall tax reductions which
S°.Tu.iSave amounted to $2.1 billion in 1971,
$1.7 billion in 1972, and $1.5 billion in 1973.
Individual income tax reductions were pro
vided for those who have been most affected by

Henry O. Jordahl and Robert B. Bragg are partners in the CPA firm of Jordahl Alitor Q ^
with offices in
Kalispell and Missoula, Montana. Mr. Jordahl graduated from Denver University ’ Mr
from the University of Montana and is a Lecturer in Taxation at the S ch o o lo f L sY n ess, Univemia business degree
of Montana.
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inflation and would be most likely to spend the
increased income. Personal exemptions were in
creased from $650 to $675 for 1971 and to $750
for subsequent years. In addition, the minimum
standard deduction was increased to 13 percent
of adjusted gross income in 1971 and 15 percent
thereafter, with a ceiling of $1,500 and $2,000
respectively. The low income allowance, which
applies only to earned income, was increased to
$1,050 for 1971 and $1,300 in 1972 and later years.
The individual income tax reductions created
by these changes are expected to amount to ap
proximately $1.4 billion in 1971 and $3.2 billion
in 1972.
3. The 7 percent excise tax on passenger cars
was repealed. Also repealed was the 10 percent
tax on light-duty trucks having a gross vehicle
weight of 10,000 pounds or less. The excise tax
repeal is effective on or after the day after the
date of enactment. Provision is made for refunds
of excise taxes paid on automobiles purchased
after August 15, 1971, but before December 31,
and light-duty trucks purchased after Septem
ber 22,1971, but before December 31. The excise
tax cuts are estimated to reduce tax liabilities
by $900 million in 1971, $2.6 billion in 1972, and
$2.3 billion in 1973.
4. To provide tax incentives for U.S. firms to
increase their exports, tax deferral is provided
for export income of domestic international
sales corporations (DISCs) effective with the
calendar year 1972. Such corporations are not
subject to taxes on their profits. Instead, the
shareholders are taxed on the profits, one-half
currently, although not distributed, and the
other half only when distributed, when stock of
the corporation is sold, or when the corporation
no longer qualifies as a DISC.
The bill also made a series of structural im
provements in the tax law. These include:
(a) Limitation in certain cases on the
standard deduction and personal exemption
of individuals receiving trust income.
(b) Limitation on carryovers of unused
credits and capital losses in case of certain
changes in ownership of corporations.
(c) Amortization of expenditures for onthe-job training and child care facilities.
(d) A revision in the definition of a net
lease (tax preference).
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(e) A modification in the application of the
farm loss provision in the case of subchapter S
corporations.
(f) A modification in the case of capital
gains distributions of accumulation trusts.
(g) A provision that income from the Vir
gin Islands is not to be treated as Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporation income.
(h) A clarification of the application of the
minimum tax to foreign capital gains on
which little or no foreign tax is imposed.
(i) A clarification of the right of taxpayers
to bring cases into courts under tax treaty
provisions.
(j) A provision for criminal penalty if in
formation furnished for tax return prepara
tion is disclosed or used other than for return
preparation.
(k) A modification of the exemption from
tax of interest on certain Industrial Develop
ment bonds.
(l) A clarification of the definition of il
legal kickbacks which are not allowed as a
tax deduction.
(m) A clarification of the hobby loss pre
sumption.
(n) A clarification of certain foreign source
income items, original issue discount on for
eign bonds, basis of property distributions re
ceived from foreign corporations. (Lessor of
Sec. 38 property may elect to treat income as
U.S. source income.)

Investment Credit is Restored
As a means of stimulating the economy, the
Job Development Investment Credit has been
restored. The credit is substantially identical
to the investment credit that was repealed by
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Taxpayers are allowed as a credit against
Federal Income Tax an amount equal to 7 per
cent of the cost of qualified property. As under
the former law, a ceiling is placed on the credit
available in any one year—$25,000 plus 50 per
cent of the tax liability in excess of $25,000.
The three-year carryback and seven-year
carryover rules for unused investment credit
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are retained. The Act provides an increase in
the carryover limit to ten years for pre-1971
unused investment credit.
Property eligible for the credit is limited to
tangible personal property acquired after Au
gust 15, 1971; property constructed by the tax
payer where construction began after March 31,
1971, or was completed after August 15, 1971;
or property ordered after March 31, 1971, but
received before August 16, 1971. Where con
struction was begun before April 1, 1971, and
completed after August 15, 1971, only the post
August 15, 1971, costs qualify for the credit.
Property manufactured outside the United
States does not qualify during the period that
the emergency 10 percent tariff surcharge was
in effect. For the first time, livestock (other
than horses) that are acquired for draft, breed
ing, or dairy purposes qualify for the reinstated
investment credit. Before the Revenue Act of
1971, livestock did not qualify for the credit.
Major differences from the old investment
credit are (1) public utility property is eligible
for a 4 percent credit rather than a 3 percent
credit; (2) the useful life brackets used in de
termining the amount of qualifying investment
have been shortened by one year as follows:
Useful Life in Years
But
At Least
Less Than
3 ggi----------------- 5
5 -----7
7 and o v e r _____

Portion of Cost
Qualifying for
Investment Credit
331 /3 %

66 %%

100 %
It is specifically provided that the useful life
selected for computing depreciation must also
be used in determining the investment credit.
Under certain limitations, noncorporate tax
payers leasing property may receive benefits of
the credit. The limitations required to qualify
leased property are: (1) the leased property
must be manufactured or produced by the les
sor, or (2) the term of the lease must be less
than 50 percent of the useful life of the leased
property and the lessor’s business expense de
ductions related to the property must be more
than 15 percent of rental income from the prop
erty for the first year of the lease. These restric
tions were enacted to deny the credit to those
taxpayers entering into lease arrangements pri
marily for the purpose of tax benefits.
In an unprecedented move, the Senate in
cluded in the law a statement requiring disclo

sure of the method of accounting used to record
the tax effect of credit in any financial reports.
It also stated that no taxpayer shall be required
to use any particular method of accounting for
the credit.

Job Development Programs
To encourage employees to establish programs
for on-the-job training and develop job oppor
tunities for welfare recipients, the Act provides
rapid amortization (60 months) of facilities used
for training centers or child care centers and a
tax credit for hiring certain employees. The Job
Development Tax Credit is equal to 20 percent
of wages and salaries paid during the first 12
months of employment to employees who are
certified by the Secretary of Labor to be under
the Work Incentive Program. The provisions of
the credit are similar to the investment credit
in that the maximum amount is limited to $25,000 plus 50 percent of the tax liability over
$25,000. There is also a credit “recapture” if the
employee is terminated any time during the
first 12 months of employment.

Class Life Depreciation System
The Act codifies the principles of the Asset
Depreciation Range (ADR) system for which
the IRS released regulations earlier this year.
Generally, all provisions of the ADR system
were continued except for the “modified halfyear convention allowing three quarters of a
full year depreciation in the first year regard
less of the month the asset was placed in service.
Congress believed this was too great an in
centive in addition to the restored investment
credit.
The ADR system is based on broad asset clas
sifications as the former depreciation guidelines
were The purpose of establishing a class life
tor the various asset categories is to minimize
conflicts over individual useful life determinations. Under ADR, the depreciation lives range
from 20 percent below to 20 percent above the
c ass 1 e for each class. Also, the complex re
serve ratio test under the former guideline
system has been eliminated. Under ADR, a tax
payer using the class life system does not have
to justify his retirement or replacement policies.

Montana Business Quarterly

A Summary of the Revenue Act of 1971

Individuals
Individuals received substantial benefits from
the Revenue Act of 1971. Personal exemptions
were increased to $675 in 1971 and $750 for 1972
and after. W hether various states will also in
crease the deduction allowed for personal ex
emptions is not known. Montana currently
allows a $600 personal exemption on the State
Income Tax return.
The standard deduction remains at 13 percent
of adjusted gross income with a maximum of
$1,500. Beginning in 1972, the standard deduc
tion will be increased to 15 percent of adjusted
gross income, with a maximum of $2,000.
The low income allowance (minimum stand
ard deduction) remains at $1,050 for 1971 but
has been increased to $1,300 for 1972 and after.
The low income allowance is designed to elimi
nate income tax for persons with incomes below
1972 “poverty levels,” and applies only to earned
income.
Withholding tables have been changed to re
flect the increase in personal exemptions, low
income allowance, and standard deduction after
1971. The apparent reduction in amounts with
held has been more than offset by a change in
the entire withholding structure. The Act in
creased amounts withheld to eliminate certain
major causes of underwithholding inherent in
the old structure. The new tables will provide
for full withholding of the tax liability on wages
up to approximately $25,000 for single persons
and $31,000 for married couples.

Child and Dependent Care
Under prior law, a deduction for child care
expenses was generally allowable if the par
ents’ combined gross income was less than
$6,000. Beginning in 1972, the maximum allow
able deduction (only for children under age 15)
has been increased from $900 to $4,800 ($400
limit in any month). Working couples may now
earn up to $18,000 and still qualify for maximum
benefits. Amounts earned in excess of $18,000
will reduce the deductible expense by 50 per
cent of the excess. For example, a family with
an income of $20,000 would reduce the amount
of deductible child care expense by $1,000. The
nature of deductible expenses has been broad
ened to include household service expenses as
well as dependent care expenses.
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Domestic International Sales
Corporation (DISC)
In order to stimulate exports, the Act provides
that a DISC will not pay tax as long as it meets
the qualifications and so elects. The income is
taxed to the shareholders as a dividend when it
is actually distributed, deemed distributed, or
currently realized by a sale of stock. The
“deemed” distribution will generally result in
the shareholder being taxed on 50 percent of
the DISC current export-related income and all
nonexport income.
A domestic corporation may qualify as a DISC
if:
1. 95 percent or more of its gross receipts are
“qualified export receipts” from the sale or
lease of property produced within the U.S. for
use outside the U.S.
2. 95 percent or more of the adjusted basis of
its assets consists of property produced in the
U.S. and held for sale outside the U.S.
3. Only one class of stock has a par or stated
value of at least $2,500.
4. The corporation has made an election to be
taxed as a DISC.

Financing of Presidential Elections
The Revenue Act of 1971 provides an alterna
tive way to finance general election campaigns
of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates
by allowing a taxpayer to designate that $1 ($2
in the case of a joint return) of his tax liability
be set aside in a special account. The taxpayer
can specify the candidate accounts to be cred
ited or put the credit in a special nonpartisan
general account fund. The so-called “checkoff”
system will apply to individual returns filed for
years ending on or after December 31, 1972.
Therefore, none of these funds will be available
for the 1972 Presidential election campaigns.

Farm Losses of Subchapter S
Corporations
Before 1970, tax accounting rules unique to
farming provided for substantial tax benefits.
For example, many currently deductible ex
penses added to the value of farm property that
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could be subsequently sold, with any gains
taxed at capital gains rates, subject only to ordi
nary income treatments of Section 1245 and Sec
tion 1250 depreciation recapture. Because of
abuse, mainly by individuals seeking tax-shel
tered investments, the Tax Reform Act of 1969
reduced some of this benefit by requiring tax
payers to accumulate net farm losses in an “ex
cess deduction account (EDA).” When certain
related farm property is sold, gain formerly
eligible for capital gain treatment is subject to
treatment as ordinary income to the extent of
the balance in the EDA.
The EDA increased only when farm losses ex
ceeded $25,000 and when nonfarm income ex
ceeded $50,000. To avoid the EDA provisions,
some taxpayers have operated farming busi
nesses through corporate structures, such as
multiple subchapter S corporations* so that no
one would have a farm loss in excess of $25,000.
To eliminate these possible abuses, the 1971
Act added provisions affecting subchapter S
corporations which generally combine share*Note: Subchapter S corporations elect not to be taxed
under the provisions of IRC Section 1371. Where the
election is made, the shareholders include their pro
portionate share of the corporation’s taxable income
or loss on their individual tax returns. A corporation
cannot have more than ten shareholders to qualify for
subchapter S status.

holders’ nonfarming income for the over $50,000
test. The Act also denies the benefit of the $25,000 exclusion if any one shareholder is also a
shareholder in another subchapter S corpora
tion that has net farm losses.

Confidential Nature of Tax Information
The 1971 Act provides criminal penalties
against tax returns preparers who disclose in
formation furnished by the taxpayer in connec
tion with preparing the tax return. This legis
lation is aimed at certain tax return preparation
services who provided information to direct
mail advertisers and other solicitors.

Conclusion
Whether the original stated objectives of the
Revenue Act of 1971 will be achieved remains
to be seen. The first income taxing legislation
in this country was to raise revenue to finance
the Civil War in 1862. Although the income tax
still provides the major source (54 percent) of
governmental funding, its economic and social
implications are becoming increasingly impor
tant. The complexity and frequent revision of
our tax laws provide a challenge to taxpayers
and tax practitioners alike.
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Montana’s Savings and Loan Associations
Growth and profitability of
savings and loan associations
in Montana, the Rocky Mountain
states, and the United States

An earlier issue of the Montana Business
Quarterly included a discussion of banking in
Montana.1 This article about Montana’s savings
and loan associations (S & Ls) parallels the ear
lier one on banking to give readers a basis for
comparing the growth and profitability of these
two types of financial institutions.
Savings and loan associations are, in many
respects, like commercial banks: they offer sav
ings deposits to the public; in turn, they make
loans to individuals, businesses, and govern
mental units. Unlike commercial banks, how
ever, they do not offer demand deposits and
they make fewer types of loans. In fact, mort
gage loans comprise the bulk of all outstanding
loans at savings and loan associations; in 1969,
for example, mortgage loans represented about
86 percent of total assets of all United States
savings and loan associations.
In Montana, the first savings and loan associa
tion opened its doors to the public in 1885, four
years before Montana became a state.2 By 1970,
‘Patricia P. Douglas, “Banking in Montana,” Montana
Business Q uarterly, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 1971.
“For a more complete history of the early developm ent
of savings and loan associations in the state see Paul
A. Johnson, “Montana’s Savings and Loan Associa
tions,” in Industrial M anifest of Montana, 1966-1970, by
the Montana State Planning Board (Kalispell, Mon
tana: Production Survey of Montana, n.d.), p. 50.

sixteen savings and loan associations were oper
ating in twelve Montana communities. Together
these institutions accounted for $304 million in
total savings deposits.8

Post World War II Growth
Table 1 shows growth rates for selected bal
ance sheet items of savings and loan associations
in Montana, the five Rocky Mountain states,
and the United States.4 As indicated there, total
assets of Montana savings and loan associations
rose from $19 million in 1946 to $252 million in
1968, or at an average annual rate of growth of
12 percent; this rate was considerably below the
“Unfortunately, som e data problems m ake the analysis
of savings and loan associations in the state difficult.
Figures published by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) excluded—at various points in tim e
since 1946— data for one or more Montana savings and
loan association; and the FHLBB series also excludes
data for one savings and loan association w hose home
office is located in Utah. Data published in the annual
proceedings of the Montana Savings and Loan League
are more inclusive than the FHLBB series; however,
they do not provide a detailed breakdown of assets or
information on the earnings of savings and loan asso
ciations. Because of this, the data used in this article
lack strict comparability from one year to the next and
also from one state to the next.
'The five Rocky Mountain states considered here are
Montana, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.

Patricia P. Douglas is a Research Associate in the Bureau of Business and Economic Research and Associate Pro
fessor at the U niversity of Montana’s School of Business Administration.
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Table 1
Selected Balance Sheet Items, Savings and Loan Associations
Montana, United States, and Rocky Mountain States, 1946-1969

Montana
($ millions)
1946
1969
Total a s s e ts --------- 19
252
Total sa v in g s.......... 17
304
Total lo a n s...........
11
222

Five Rocky
Mountain States
($ millions)
1946
1969
166
3,637
140
3,007
116
3,195

United States
($ millions)
1946
1969
9,017
158,732
7,633
132,739
6,580
139,303

Average Annual Percent Change
1946-1969
F ive Rocky
United Mountain
Montana States
States
12.0
13.3
14.4
13.5
13.2
14.3
13.8
14.2
15.5

Sources: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Combined Financial Statem ents, 1946 and 1969 (Washington, D.C.);
Proceedings of the . . . Annual Meeting of the Montana Savings and Loan League, 1969.
Note: Savings deposit data for Montana S & Ls include the accounts of the Utah-based firm, w hile total assets and
total loans for Montana exclude figures for this same S & L, as w ell as associations who are not members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board.

annual growth rate for all United States S & Ls
and those in the Rocky Mountain states. Like
wise, total loans grew more slowly in Montana
for the entire postwar period than in the United
States or the Rocky Mountain states as a whole.
Only in the case of savings deposits (and this
includes those of the Utah-based S & L) did
Montana S & Ls outpace their national counter
parts during the postwar period. At the same
time, savings deposits increased less rapidly at
Montana S & Ls than at those in the Rocky
Mountain area. It is possible, of course, that the
figures for Montana S & Ls would have looked
better had we been able to include nonmember
associations, but it is doubtful that these addi
tions would have pulled the growth rates sub
stantially above those for S & Ls located in the
Rocky Mountain states and in the United States.
Data for the entire postwar period provide a
general comparison between the nation’s and
Montana’s savings and loan associations. But
to see more clearly the trends in the growth of
savings and loan associations and to pinpoint
the turning point for Montana’s institutions, we

must look at subperiods within the postwar era.
Table 2 shows that the growth of assets and
loans of savings and loan associations in the
United States and Montana was much slower
during the 1957-1969 period than it was during
the early postwar years. This decline in the
overall growth of S & Ls reflected a decline in
the growth rate for total savings deposits, from
roughly 16 to 17 percent per year during the
1946-1956 period to about 10 percent per year
from 1957 on.
Mounting competition for time and savings
deposits explains, in large part, the slowdown
in savings and loan association deposit growth
after 1956. At that time, other financial institu
tions, chiefly commercial banks, began seriously
competing with S & Ls for time and savings de
posits. Rates paid on time and savings deposits
rose sharply. And S & Ls and commercial banks
tried to outdo one another by offering new types
of savings deposits as well as giveaway items
ranging from art objects to cameras.
These competitive pressures intensified during
the early 1960s: average rates paid to depositors

Table 2
Growth Rates for Selected Balance Sheet Items, Savings and Loan Associations
Montana and United States, 1946-1956 and 1957-1969

M ontana_
United States

__________
Average Annual Percent Change
Savings Deposits
Total Assets
Total Loans------1957-*969 1946-1956 1957-1969 1946-1956 1957-1969
15-8
9-1
15.5
9.3
19 1
99
167
“ •«
16-4
10.9
H

fr°"? )Federal Home Loan Bank Board' C“
*d Financial Statem ents, 1946. 1956, and 1969
Note: Original data used are year-end figures for the various years.
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Montana's Savings and Loan Associations
at commercial banks rose relative to those at
savings and loan associations. As a result, the
growth in savings deposits at S & Ls in the
United States and Montana alike slowed from
the record-setting pace of the 1946-1956 period.
But, as table 2 also shows, Montana savings
and loan associations had more than their share
of declining growth after 1956. That is, the gap
between national and statewide growth of sav
ings and loan associations widened during the
1957-1969 period. Between 1957 and 1969 total
savings capital grew at 9.1 percent per year in
Montana versus 10.6 percent annually in the
United States as a whole. And whereas total
loans had previously grown more rapidly at
Montana’s than at the nation’s savings and loan
associations, they now were growing more
slowly.
Breaking the 1957-1969 subperiod into even
smaller intervals indicates that the most diffi
cult growth period for Montana S & Ls was
from 1960 on. Between 1960 and 1969 total sav
ings deposits averaged a 7.8 percent annual in
crease at Montana savings and loan associations
compared to 9.9 percent per year at S & Ls in
the United States.
Moreover, the share of total savings deposits
(total time and savings deposits of credit unions,
savings and loan associations, and commercial
banks) held by savings and loan associations in
the state declined during the 1960s. By 1969 the
share held by the state’s S & Ls had decreased
to 27 percent of the total, down from 35 percent
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in 1960. Savings and loan associations nation
wide experienced a decline in their share of the
total, too, but the drop was not nearly as severe
as it was for Montana S & Ls.
The findings of the Montana Economic Study
suggest that the slow growth of S & L deposits
might reflect the sluggishness of the state’s
economy during the 1960s. Comparisons of the
changes in personal income and total S & L
deposits for Montana and the United States tend
to support that conclusion. As table 3 shows, the
percent change in personal income was lower
in the United States than in Montana during the
1960s. However, during the same period the per
cent change in total savings was lower in Mon
tana than in the United States. Further, the
ratio of change in savings capital to the change
in personal income was lower for Montana than
for the nation as a whole. That means that
United States savings and loan associations out
paced S & Ls in the state in relation to economic
growth.
The relatively slow growth of Montana insti
tutions also reflected the size composition of the
state’s S & Ls: as was true of commercial banks,
the smaller the S & L, the lower the growth
rate for total savings deposits. Since Montana
has a large number of small S & Ls compared to
the United States, the average growth rate for
all S & Ls in the state was greatly influenced
by the slow growth of the smaller S & Ls.
Then, too, the location as well as the number
of Montana savings and loan associations played

Table 3
Relationship of Changes in Personal Income and Savings Capital
Montana and United States, 1960-1969

T otal personal incom e ($ m illions) ..........
T o ta l savings capital ($ m illions) ..............
P erce n t change, 1960-1969
P erso n al incom e ......................................
T otal s a v in g s .........................
R atio of p erc en t change in to tal
savings to p erc en t change in
perso n al incom e (in percentages) .....

Montana
1960
1969
1,383
2,172
154
304

United States
1960
1969
596,598
740,161
56,614
132,739

57.0
97 4

24.1
134.5

170.9

558.1

Sources: [Savings] F ed era l H om e L oan B ank Board, C om bined Financial S ta tem en ts,
1960 an d 1969 (W ashington, D .C.); Proceedings o f th e . . . A n n u a l M eeting o f the
M ontana Savings and Loan League, 1960 an d 1969.
[P ersonal Incom e] U.S. D ep artm en t of Com m erce, O ffice of B usiness Economics,
P ersonal Incom e by States, Since 1929, S upplem en t to th e S u rv e y of C urrent B usiness
(W ashington, D.C.: U.S. G overnm ent P rin tin g Office, 1956); idem ., S u rv e y o f C urrent
B usiness, vol. 50, no. 8 (A ugust 1970).
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some part in their overall growth. Most Mon
tana communities have a bank, whereas only
twelve Montana communities have one or more
savings and loan association. Put another way,
Montana has fewer people per commercial
banking office but more people per savings and
loan association than does the United States.
When competition is great, as it was during the
1960s, convenience may well influence deposi
tors. Although until 1961, Montana S & Ls ac
counted for a larger share of the state’s total
savings deposits than was true for all S & Ls
in the United States, that share fell substan
tially below the national average by 1969. (Com
petitive factors other than convenience may
account for the decline in the share of total time
and savings deposits held by Montana S & Ls.
However, the difference does not seem to reflect
rates paid on deposits: yield differentials be
tween S & Ls and comercial banks have been
almost identical in Montana and the United
States throughout the postwar period.)

percent respectively for Montana and United
States savings and loan associations.
Then from 1957 to 1960 (with the exception of
1958), when savings and loan associations found
competitive pressures growing, increases in
gross yield on assets were offset by rising interest costs on deposits at Montana S & Ls. At the
nation’s S & Ls interest rates paid on time and
savings deposits were actually rising faster than
yields on mortgage loans. Thus, while the net
return on assets remained fairly constant at
Montana S & Ls from 1957-1960, it declined nationally.
Between 1960 and 1965, changes in earnings
and expenses were comparable at savings and
loan associations in Montana, the five Rocky
Mountain states, and the United States. How
ever, the absolute rate paid on time and savings
deposits was lower at Montana S & Ls than else
where in the country. This helped to hold down
overall costs and consequently to boost the net
rate of return on assets at Montana’s institutions

Trends in S & L Earnings: 1946-1969

FIGURE 1

Figure 1 shows net operating income (gross
income less operating expenses and dividends)
as a percentage of total assets for savings and
loan associations in Montana, the United States,
and the five Rocky Mountain states. As indi
cated, the net rate of return on S & L assets was
lower in Montana than in the nation or the
Rocky Mountain states throughout most of the
1949-1963 period. After rising above the national
and regional averages from 1964-1967, the net
rate of return on assets of Montana S & Ls once
again fell below that for S & Ls in the United
States and the Rocky Mountain states.
The comparatively poor performance of Mon
tana S & Ls can be traced to various factors, de
pending upon the specific subperiod examined.
From 1949 to 1956, gross yield on S & L assets
was well below national or regional averages.
And the differential between national (or re
gional) and statewide expense rates was not
large enough to offset the difference in gross
yields. For example, in 1956 the average gross
yield on assets of Montana savings and loan as
sociations was 4.27 percent versus 4.62 percent
for all S & Ls in the United States; at the same
time, total costs (including dividend payments)
as a percentage of total assets was 3.47 and 3.67

NET OPERATING INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL ASSETS
Savings and Loan Associations
Montana, United States, and Rocky Mountain States
1946-1969

F o m U n ^ I ^ n fr? o ! ederal Home Loan Bank Board,
ton D C .f md )
Statem ents’ 1947-1969 (Washingassociatinne: . '
31 assets data for savings and loan
orieSSi
i
year-end figures for 1946-1964; other
ongm al total assets data are annual averages.
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Montana*s Savings and Loan Associations
above regional and national averages in 1964
and 1965.
In 1966, interest payments on deposits at sav
ings and loan associations everywhere skyrock
eted and yields on loans rose only slowly,
causing the net return on assets to plummet.
Near the end of 1966 savings and loan associa
tions were for the first time subjected to direct
controls on rates paid depositors. After 1967,
regulatory agencies held the line on the maxi
mum rates payable on time and savings deposits
while loan rates continued climbing. As a re
sult, the net rate of return on S & L assets
turned upward. Recovery was slower at Mon
tana S & Ls because yields on mortgage loans
rose less rapidly here than nationally.

Implications for Future Growth
and Profitability
Savings and loan associations in the United
States and Montana alike have fared poorly dur
ing periods of aggressive competition: from 1956
to 1966 savings deposits (and consequently total
assets) grew slowly, in comparison to earlier
periods, and the net rate of return on S & L as
sets declined. The partial recovery after 1966
reflected the combined effect of regulatory con
trols and rising market rates more than the
renewed competitive strength of savings and
loan associations.
The outlook for savings and loan associations
depends importantly on the degree to which
their lending powers are increased. In order to
compete for savings capital, savings and loan
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associations must maintain attractive rates on
savings deposits. Thus, when market rates are
rising rapidly so are the rates paid on time and
savings deposits at S & Ls. But because S & Ls
invest primarily in long-term mortgages, they
are unable to adjust loan rates upward as
rapidly as rates on deposits or as rapidly as
other financial institutions, such as commercial
banks, who have a better balance between
long- and short-term loans. The result: S & L
profit margins decline both absolutely and rela
tive to other financial institutions during peri
ods of rising interest rates. In fact, Congress
subjected S & Ls to direct rate controls at the
end of 1966 in part to stop further deterioration
in S & L earnings and reserves.
It seems likely to this author that savings and
loan associations will, in the near future, be
granted more power to invest in short-term con
sumer loans. If that happens, rate ceilings might
be removed or lifted so as not to interfere with
competition. With freedom to compete for de
posits and with lending flexibility to achieve a
better balance of maturities in their asset port
folios, the growth rate for savings and loan as
sociations will probably rise above the levels of
the 1956-1969 period. W hether Montana S & Ls
share in that potential growth depends largely
on the outlook for Montana’s economy. The
projections made in the Montana Economic
Study are not too encouraging. Therefore, we
will not be surprised if the growth of Montana
savings and loan associations continues to lag
behind national averages.
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Consumer Credit Counseling:
An Alternative to Bankruptcy
The economic effects
on a community of consumer
credit counseling
I ntroduction
In recent years the productive capacity of our
national economy has increased rapidly. To fa
cilitate the distribution of the growing number
of goods and services, the use of consumer credit
has been greatly expanded and the pressure to
buy is ever present. For many the result has
been indiscriminate behavior in the marketplace
causing a variety of debt-related problems. A
sharp increase in personal insolvencies has ac
companied the unequaled prosperity of the six
ties.
What mechanism does our society provide for
the relief of the debt-ridden individual? His
torically, this problem has been most frequently
dealt with through bankruptcy, a legal mecha
nism whereby an individual may be discharged
from all or most of his debt obligations. These
bankruptcies are very costly, not only for the
nation’s credit grantors, but for the nation’s
credit users and taxpayers. The problems in
volved are exceedingly complex and a simple
solution is unlikely.
Bankruptcy is only a relatively small part of
the total problem of credit and personal finan
cial difficulties. But it is perhaps the most dis

turbing and also the most visible aspect of the
problem. As such, it has been the subject of a
considerable amount of research. Most of this
research has been concerned with answering
some basic questions regarding the characteris
tics of personal bankrupts. Who are they? Why
have they retreated into bankruptcy as a solu
tion to their debt problems?
------------ —
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quacy of the bankruptcy mechanism as a means
or dealing with the problems associated with
personal over-indebtedness. One of the recom
mendations to come out of many of these studies
has been the increased use of consumer credit
counseling as an alternative means of lessening
or alleviating the burden falling upon a debtridden individual. However, little if any of the
research undertaken to date has dealt specifica y ,W1. a single, operating credit counseling
service in an attempt to evaluate its impact on
the community it serves.
This article will analyze the economic impact
• a specific community credit counseling serv
ice, the Consumer Credit Counseling Service of
Missoula, Montana. It will not evaluate any so
cial or other noneconomic impact that such a
service might have on its community.

Michael Collins has recently completed graduate work at the Universitv of
, ..
in Business Administration.
He is currently serving a tour of duty with the ^ r ^ o r r ! f admgJ ° 3 Masters DeSree
Officer.
y
n tne Alr Force as a Management Analysis
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Consumer Credit Counseling

Bankruptcy
A bankruptcy mechanism has been operating
in this country since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
The Bankruptcy Act was intended to deal pri
marily with business failures, although it ap
plied to individuals as well. It provides for a
process whereby a debtor may petition for the
discharge of his debts. His assets are collected
by the court and sold for cash (with the excep
tion of certain assets which are exempted by
the state in which he resides). Funds generated
in this manner are then distributed among his
creditors on a ratable basis and the debtor is
discharged from whatever debts are not satis
fied.1 Bankruptcy must thus be distinguished
from insolvency. Insolvency refers to the finan
cial condition which exists when a debtor’s as
sets are not capable of satisfying all of his debt
obligations. Bankruptcy on the other hand, is a
legal designation. A debtor is adjudged a bank
rupt by a federal court.
When the Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1898
personal bankruptcies were relatively uncom
mon, especially when compared to the number
of business filings. In recent years the trend has
been quite different. Not only has the number
of personal bankruptcies increased sharply, but
the overwhelming majority of total bankruptcy
cases are now classified as being nonbusiness or
personal. Also, there has been some increase in
personal bankruptcies as a percentage of the
total. From 1960 to 1967 the number of personal
bankruptcy cases filed annually nearly doubled.
During these years personal bankruptcies grew
from 89 percent to 92 percent of the total. Since
1967 there has been a slow, but steady decrease
in the number of personal bankruptcies filed
each year and personal bankruptcies as a per
centage of the total appear to have leveled off.
However, the average number of personal bank
ruptcy cases filed each year during the last half
of the decade was 176,386, well above the 131,135
average for the first half of the decade.
What does this increasing number of personal
bankruptcies mean? It could mean one of two
things: either more people are becoming insol
vent, or more of those who become insolvent are
choosing bankruptcy as a solution. Likely it is a
'Duane G. Harris, “Prosperity and Personal Bank
ruptcy,” Business R eview (Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, August 1971), p. 3.
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combination of both. But regardless, the in
creasing number of personal bankruptcies sug
gests that an already large group of overex
tended debtors is growing steadily.2
The cost of personal bankruptcy is disturbing.
An estimated one billion dollars per year is
wasted as a result of nonbusiness bankruptcies.3
Most creditors realize little if anything from
personal bankruptcy proceedings. But the costs
of bankruptcy are not borne solely by the na
tion’s credit grantors. The bankrupt himself
must deal with whatever cost might be attached
to the stigma of having been adjudged a bank
rupt. Also, costs fall upon both the consumer
and the taxpayer. Much of the cost of losses
from bad debts is passed along by business in
the form of higher prices and interest charges.
In addition, taxes pay for a portion of what the
bankruptcy process actually costs to operate.
Why do we even have a bankruptcy system, in
view of the tremendous costs associated with it?
Richard Matsch offers the following explanation
in a critique on bankruptcy:
It is designed to be a kind of safety valve for
the pressures generated by the conflicts which
develop w here the exchange of goods and
services takes place through m ultiple exten 
sions of credit from a number of unconnected
sou rces/

He is referring to two different types of pres
sure: the pressure on a debtor caused by the
collection efforts of his creditors and the pres
sure created among those who have extended
credit to a common debtor who is not capable of
satisfying his debt obligations. In attempting to
minimize these pressures, the bankruptcy mech
anism must have a two-fold purpose. It must
offer relief to the debtor while at the same time
providing for creditor satisfaction. As it now op
erates, bankruptcy normally relieves the debtor
of his obligations by discharging his debts, but
may provide little if anything in the way of
creditor satisfaction. In bankruptcy, the liqui
dation of the petitioner’s assets is often the sole
source of satisfaction for his creditors. They
may well find, however, that the only asset the
3 Ibid., p. 6.
3George Sullivan, The Boom in Going B ust (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 172.
"'Richard P. Matsch, “Bankruptcy: A Study in Func
tional Obsolescence,” C redit and Financial Manage
m ent, April 1970, p. 16.
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petitioner possesses is his earning capacity,
which is frequently made inaccessible to them.
In such cases bankruptcy is ineffective in deal
ing fairly with both debtor and creditor.5
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act does give
a debtor the option of repaying his creditors
through a repayment plan administered by the
court. But for a number of reasons its use has
been neither consistent nor widespread. The
court itself has no power to require or even en
courage its use. The attitudes of the legal com
munity and the creditors involved regarding
Chapter XIII do have some effect on the extent
to which it is used. But the choice of whether
to attempt to repay one’s debts through Chapter
XIII or whether to seek a discharge from them
through straight bankruptcy still rests largely
with the debtor. Also, one may ask if it is the
proper role of the judiciary to plan and adminis
ter the repayment of an individual’s debts. Fi
nally, because an individual is associated with
the Bankruptcy Act in pursuing the repayment
of his debts through Chapter XIII, he may find
that he must deal with the stigma of bank
ruptcy, although he is technically not a bank
rupt.
For the debtor the bankruptcy process is nei
ther preventative nor rehabilitative. Bankruptcy
itself offers little opportunity for the debtor to
obtain professional counseling. When an indi
vidual finds himself in financial trouble he is
usually hesitant to seek out his creditors for help
and turns instead to a friend, relative, or some
other party who may well have little training in
personal money management. A petitioner in
bankruptcy may be counseled briefly by a law
yer in filling out the petition and other paper
work, but at this point it is often too late. It is
estimated that for every family experiencing
bankruptcy, twenty or more are experiencing
financial problems and could benefit greatly
from professional counseling.6 In addition, many
of the debtors choosing to file bankruptcy could
have repaid their creditors had they so desired
and been so advised. Bankruptcy laws make
no provision for counseling to rehabilitate the
debtor once a discharge is granted. Even when
a Chapter XIII plan is undertaken, the debtor*
*Ibid.
*Family Services Association of America, Fam ily Credit
Counseling—An Emerging Com m unity Service, Sum 
m ary Report (New York, 1970), p. 9.

who attempts to repay his debts in this way may
find that it is little more than an exercise in
negotiation and the routine disbursement of
funds. As a result of the absence of rehabilita
tive efforts, many bankrupts are repeaters.
The bankruptcy process, therefore, despite its
increased use and tremendous cost, does not
appear to be an effective solution to the prob
lems associated with personal over-indebtedness.
However, it is doubtful that the need for bank
ruptcy will ever totally disappear. There will
always be those who for one reason or another
become so hopelessly indebted that the dis
charge of their debts is the only possibility for
relief. But for those whose debt problems are
less severe, the need exists for other alternatives
which can be of greater benefit to the debtor,
while at the same time reducing the losses to
creditors and other costs of bankruptcy. Con
sumer credit counseling on a community service
basis is such an alternative.

The Need for Consumer
Credit Counseling
The consumer credit counseling service is a
relatively new phenomenon. The need for this
service has become increasingly apparent dur
ing the past decade. Counseling services have
been started in communities across the country;
currently, there are more than fifty in operation
throughout the United States and Canada and
many more are in the planning stage.7 Most are
located in the larger metropolitan areas. It is
important to distinguish between a consumer
credit counseling service and a commercial debt
adjuster or “prorater.” Commercial adjusters
usually charge the debtor a high percentage of
the outstanding debt for their services, and in
many cases the debtor is victimized. The quality
of the counseling provided often fails to justify
its high cost. The result has been that credit
counseling for a fee has been prohibited in many
states. Consumer credit counseling services, on
the other hand, usually are made available to
the debtor at no cost, although sometimes a
nommal fee is charged to help defray operating
expenses.
Tho typical consumer credit counseling serv
ice is not a charity organization, a lending insti,Ibid.
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tution, or a collection agency. It is a nonprofit
community service, ordinarily financed through
contributions from the business community. A
credit counseling service has two primary objec
tives: 1) to assist debt-ridden families, and 2) to
prevent credit mismanagement through educa
tion.8 But most counseling services fail to pro
vide consumer education because they lack
enough personnel and funds. Instead, they con
centrate their efforts on helping individual fam
ilies with serious debt problems.
A consumer credit counseling service can pro
vide a number of services ranging from advice
on personal money management to designing a
repayment plan to enable the debtor to liquidate
his debts. If the debtor has some margin of
income above that necessary to maintain an ade
quate standard of living, the counselor can de
sign a payment schedule tailored to his needs
and capacity. The repayment plan will likely
require creditor approval so that payments may
be extended and carrying charges dropped. But
creditors are usually cooperative, not only be
cause of humanitarian and public relations con
siderations, but because they would prefer to see
a debtor placed on an adjusted payment plan
than risk losing the entire account through
bankruptcy.
Consumer credit counseling offers many sub
stantial benefits. The debtor benefits in several
ways: he is able to overcome his debt problems
without retreating into bankruptcy and satisfies
the obligations to his creditors in the process.
Also, as long as his repayment plan operates he
is not subject to legal action involving his debts
or the garnishment of his wages. In addition, he
stands to benefit greatly from the rehabilitative
counseling. He is likely to emerge from the re
payment program with greater confidence, selfreliance, and new and healthier ideas regarding
family money management. The creditor, of
course, receives regular payments on an account
that might otherwise be worthless. The debtor’s
employer is spared the expense and bother of
garnishment procedures and may also benefit
from decreases in absenteeism, reduced accident
rate, and increased productivity. Finally, the
entire community benefits from a service that
helps people help themselves with their debt
problems. The economic fabric of the commun‘Stephen P. Coha, “Consumer Counseling,” Bankers
M onthly, January 15, 1967, p. 38.
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ity is strengthened by the efforts of a credit
counseling service in discouraging the use of
bankruptcy, providing programs for the repay
ment of endangered accounts, and enabling a
participant in its programs to become a more
stable economic unit. Similarly, a community’s
social fabric is strengthened by its efforts to
assist a debtor in safeguarding his job and in
maintaining his family’s stability and well
being.
The potential economic impact of a counseling
service on the community in which it operates
appears great. But is it? The remainder of this
article is an attempt to answer this question
based on a case study of the Consumer Credit
Counseling Service of Missoula.

Missoula Consumer Credit Counseling
Service’s Economic Impact on the
Community, 1966-1970
In 1966, a group of Missoula business leaders
concerned with personal debt problems and
alarmed by the number of bankruptcies in the
Missoula area established the Consumer Credit
Counseling Service of Missoula. A board of di
rectors and advisory board were selected from
interested and capable people in the community.
The counseling service was incorporated as a
private nonprofit corporation in 1967. Initial fi
nancing was obtained through a loan from the
Missoula Chamber of Commerce. The opera
tions of the counseling service have since been
financed through contributions in the form of
memberships purchased by area professionals
and businessmen.9
The procedures utilized by the Missoula Cred
it Counseling Service in implementing its pro
grams are relatively straightforward. A client
first completes a form showing his current fi
nancial condition. On the basis of what this
statement reveals about his financial status, the
counselor may advise him in a number of ways.
The client may require only brief counseling on
a particular budget problem or a decision in
volving credit. On the other hand, the indi
vidual may be so hopelessly in debt that the
counselor must regretfully inform him that the
•Earl Slack (counselor), interview held at the office of
the Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Missoula,
October 1971.

W inter 1972

30

Michael T. Collins

service can be of no direct benefit to him other
than recommending bankruptcy as his only al
ternative. For those who have debt problems
but whose financial condition is not so severe,
the counselor may recommend a repayment pro
gram with the help and guidance of the counsel
ing service. In this case the counselor will pre
pare a payment schedule, taking into account
the client’s income, necessary expenses, and
debt structure. The client then seeks out his
creditors for their approval. After all of his
creditors agree to the program a trust checking
account is set up for the client and arrange
ments are made for handling the monthly pay
ments. The client ordinarily visits the office
each month. He makes out the checks due each
of his creditors. The counselor countersigns the
checks and they are mailed to the client’s cred
itors. During the counseling period the client
learns to handle his own affairs, live within a
budget, and at the same time is able to make
steady monthly contributions toward the liqui
dation of his debt.
An attempt to analyze the disbursement of
funds by clients of the credit counseling service
is hindered somewhat by the unavailability of
some information and a general lack of uniform
ity in the information which is available. But
despite these hindrances, enough can be gleaned
from the records of the counseling service to
show the magnitude of the returns it has gener
ated for creditors in the Missoula area.
Over one-half million dollars has been paid
to creditors by clients of the counseling service
since its operations began late in 1966. During
the first 18 months of operation, an average of
$4,744 was repaid each month. By 1970, this
monthly average had increased to nearly $12,000
with $143,229 being paid to creditors during the
year. But these figures represent only the
amount repaid by clients actually participating
in a repayment program supervised by the
counseling service. Each year many programs
are terminated. The dollar value of these pro
grams is substantial. For example, in 1970 the
outstanding debt associated with terminations
totaled $94,075. Some of these terminated pro
grams are failures in the sense that the client
has chosen for one reason or another to discon
tinue his payments. In other cases the client has
merely assumed the responsibility of the pay
ments himself. He continues to make regular

payments to his creditors but without the super
vision of the counseling service. In addition, the
counseling service may well have stimulated
payments to creditors by individuals who have
come to the service for advice and consultation
but have never actually been placed on a repayment program. So the amounts stated may well
be rather conservative as an estimate of the
total debt repaid as a result of the services provided by the counseling service.
The number of personal bankruptcies filed
each year in Missoula County from 1965 through
1970 is presented in the first column of table 1.
Table 1
Personal Bankruptcies in Missoula County as a
Percentage of Personal Bankruptcies for the
State as a Whole, 1965-1970
Personal Bankruptcies

Year
1965 _
1966 ....
1967 ...
1968 .
1969 .......
1970 .

Missoula
County
(a)
... 86
... 83
... 77
... 86
.... 76
... 66

Montana4'
(b)
572
612
659
697
952
NA

(a) as a
Percent
of (b)
15.0
13.6
11.7
12.3
8.0

Source: *Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Tables of Bankruptcies Statistics.
NA denotes not available.

With the exception of 1968, the number of bank
ruptcies filed each year has decreased steadily
since 1965. In order to judge the significance of
this trend, it is appropriate to relate the number
of bankruptcies filed annually in the county to
some other variables. Table 1 relates the num
ber of bankruptcies filed in the county to the
number filed each year in the state as a whole.
The county figure is expressed as a percentage
of the state figure. This percentage shows a
downward trend which is similar but more dra
matic than the trend in the number of bank
ruptcies filed in the county. The number of
bankruptcies in the state as a whole has in
creased each year since 1965; this figure is not
avaiiable for 1970. But the fact that the number
of bankruptcies filed in the state has shown a
steady increase, along with the fact that the
number of bankruptcies filed in the county
dropped from 76 in 1969 to 66 in 1970, would inicate a strong probability that the percentage
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figure for 1970 may be considerably less than
the 8 percent for 1969.
In table 2 the number of personal bankrupt
cies filed in Missoula County is related to popu
lation changes in the county. The best available
estimates show that the county’s population has
Table 2
Personal Bankruptcies per Thousand Residents in
Missoula County, 1965-1970

Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Personal
Bankruptcies
___ 86
—_____ 83
_______ 77
__ ____ 86
_______ 76
______ 66

Population
47,300*
52,300*
52,900*
55,100*
55,800f
58,263$

Bankruptcies
per 1,000
Residents
1.82
1.59
1.46
1.56
1.36
1.13

Sources: ‘ Montana State Board of Health, Annual
Statistical Supplem ent.
tBureau of Business and Economic Research, Univer
sity of Montana, citing U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, unpublished data, September
30, 1971.
$U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
1970 Census of Population, M ontana, A dvance Report.

increased each year since 1965. Taking popula
tion into account, the number of personal bank
ruptcies appears to be decreasing at an even
more rapid rate. Bankruptcies per thousand
residents have decreased at a faster rate than
the actual number of bankruptcies.
Unemployment is often cited as having a
weighty influence on bankruptcy rates. Unfor
tunately, there is no accurate measure of the
rate of unemployment in Missoula County for
the years in question. The best available indi
cator of unemployment in the county is the
amount of unemployment benefits paid each
year. But these figures have serious shortcom
ings as indicators of changes in the actual rate
of unemployment, which detract from the va
lidity of any judgments that might be based on
them. Nevertheless, an examination of these
figures fails to show any significant reduction in
unemployment since 1965.
It is clear that the number of personal bank
ruptcies filed annually in Missoula County has
decreased rather steadily since 1965. This de
crease has not been caused by a reduction in the
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population of the county. On the contrary, the
county’s population has increased each year
since 1965. And although it is not very reliable,
there is some evidence that the decrease in the
number of bankruptcies is not the result of a
significant reduction in unemployment in the
county. Can this downward trend in bank
ruptcy be attributed solely to the impact of the
Missoula Credit Counseling Service? It would
be imprudent to make such an argument. The
impact of the counseling service cannot be iso
lated, and a number of other factors may be
contributing to this trend. Among the possibili
ties are changes in the attitudes of lawyers in
the community regarding bankruptcy, the in
creased availability of credit counseling from
other sources, and changes in the credit policy
and collection practices of area creditors. But
the credit counseling service has undoubtedly
been a factor; and in view of the amount of
money returned to creditors as a result of its
programs, it may well be the major factor un
derlying this trend.
A reduction in bankruptcies has meant a sav
ings to creditors in Missoula County in the form
of smaller losses owing to uncollectible accounts.
Table 3 displays the total amount of creditors’
claims in personal bankruptcy proceedings dur
ing each year from 1965 through 1970. The total
Table 3
Total Creditors' Claims A llow ed on Bankruptcy
Petitions Filed in Missoula County, 1965-1970
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

..
..
..
..
..
_

Personal
Bankruptcies
_ 86
... 83
____ 77
™ 86
__ 76
________ 66

Total
Claims*
$513,053.38
429,969.57
462,803.43
507,682.00
427,096.62
418,619.20

♦These figures w ere derived from a case-by-case
search of court records w hich yielded the data on the
number of bankruptcies in the county.

amount of debt claimed by creditors in each of
these years follows a trend similar to that for
the number of personal bankruptcies. In 1968
the amount claimed by creditors increased over
the amount claimed during each of the two pre
vious years. But since 1968 the amount claimed
has decreased each year. In 1970, creditors
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claimed $89,062.80 less in credit extended to in
dividuals petitioning for bankruptcy than they
did in 1968 and $94,434.18 less than they did in
1965. Of course, creditors may not lose 100 per
cent of what is owed them by bankruptcy peti
tioners, but the percentage is high. It is a rare
case in which the petitioner has assets whose
value is greater than the amount required to
pay for legal fees and the administrative charges
of the court. In a sample of bankrupts who had
petitioned for bankruptcy in Missoula County
during the years 1968 through 1970, not a penny
of the debt owed by the bankrupts was ever
disbursed to their creditors. A reduction in the
amount of debt owed by bankrupts in the county
is likely, therefore, to result in a savings to cred
itors of almost equal magnitude. Thus, the fig
ures presented in table 3 seem to indicate that
although there is no steady trend, the losses of
Missoula creditors each year owing to bank
ruptcy have been considerably reduced since
1965.
This section has attempted to analyze the eco
nomic impact of the Missoula Credit Counseling
Service since its operations began in 1966. The
analysis has been approached in two ways, the
first dealing with funds disbursed by clients of
the service to their creditors, and the second
with changes in the number of bankruptcies
filed each year in the county and in the amount
of debt claimed by creditors in these cases. The
findings of both approaches reinforce one an
other. Missoula creditors have received over
one-half million dollars from individuals at
tempting to liquidate their debts through pro
grams provided by the counseling service. In
addition, there are strong indications that the
counseling service programs have been the ma
jor factor underlying the downward trend in
the number of personal bankruptcies filed each
year in the county, which in turn has meant
substantial savings to creditors.

Potential Impact of the Consumer
Credit Counseling Service on
Missoula’s Economy
We have seen that the Missoula Credit Coun
seling Service has had an important impact on
the area’s economy. It may be useful now to
evaluate the potential economic impact of the
service and contrast this potential to the actual

impact of its past operations. To do this it is
necessary to investigate both the debt structure
and repayment capacity of Missoula bankrupts
as compared to that of the clients of the counsel
ing service.
A random sample was taken of the bank
ruptcy cases filed in Missoula County between
1968 and 1970. This sample, comprising 25 per
cent of the cases, revealed quite a range in the
total amount of liabilities claimed by creditors
in each case, from $1,186 to $19,115. However,
in most cases, the petitioner’s total debt was be
tween $2,000 and $6,000. The mean (simple
arithmetic average) for the sample was $6,786.
The median (midpoint of a list of figures or
dered by size) was $5,470. A percentage break
down of the amount of liabilities claimed by
creditors in the cases sampled is presented in
table 4.
Table 4
Liabilities Claimed by Creditors in the Missoula
Bankruptcy Cases Sampled
Liabilities
$
0-1,999 ...
2,000-3,999 ...
4,000-5,999 ...
6,000-7,999 ...
8,000-9,999 ...
10,000 and over
T o ta l..............

Number
of Cases
-------- 1
------15
-------- 20
S __ 8
— 3
... 14
..... 61

Percent
1.6
24.6
32.8
13.1
4.9
23.0
100.0

Mean: $6,786
Median: $5,470

In examining an individual’s debt burden it is
relevant to consider not only the amount of debt
e owes, but the number of creditors to whom
he is obligated. In the cases sampled, the peti
tioners had from 6 to 66 creditors, with a mean
number of 25 and a median of 22. Table 5 shows
e percentage breakdown for the sample with
regard to the number of creditors each petil(mer had at the time he filed for bankruptcy,
.before considering how much income the
bankruptey petitioners in the sample had from
w ic they could attempt to repay their debts,
some explanation regarding the income data is
necessary. On the forms which a petitioner
mus complete in filing for bankruptcy, he is
required to state the income he received during
tne two years previous to the filing of his peti-
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Table 5

Table 6

Number of Creditors Submitting Claims in the Missoula
Bankruptcy Cases Sampled

A verage M onthly Income of the Bankrupts Sampled
During the Two Years Im m ediately Preceding Filing
of a Bankruptcy Petition

Number
Creditors
of Cases
0- 9 ........
____ 3
10-19 _________ ______ 21
20-29 _____
______ 21
30-39 _________ ______ 6
40-49 ...
___ _ 7
50 and over ... ____ _ 3
Total .
_____ 61
Mean: 25
Median: 22
♦Error due to rounding.

Percent
4.9
34.4
34.4
9.8
11.5
4.9
99.9*

Average
Monthly
Income
$
0-199 „
200-399 400-599 ..
600-799 _
800-999 „
1,000 and over ...
Total ...
Mean: $374
Median: $354

tion. But there are a number of factors which
detract from the credibility of these figures.
First of all, it is not specified on the form
whether the amount stated is to represent the
petitioner’s gross or net income. In the cases
sampled, some of the figures are rounded to the
nearest hundred dollars, while others are ex
pressed to the penny. This would seem to indi
cate that some of the petitioners stated a gross
figure and some stated a net figure. Second,
there may be some inducement for the petition
er to understate his income. He may purposely
seek to make his situation look as desperate
as possible in the hope that the court will
grant him a discharge. And third, the amounts
disclosed on the forms may bear no relationship
to the petitioner’s income at any point in time
after he has filed his petition. He may soon
after be fired, receive a cut in pay, or even re
ceive a raise in pay. But despite the fact that
these stated amounts may not be completely
credible, they represent the best available esti
mate of a bankrupt’s income.
As stated by the petitioners in the cases sam
pled, average monthly incomes during the two
years preceding the filing of a bankruptcy peti
tion ranged from $83 to $833. The mean income
was $374 and the median was $354. A break
down of the incomes of the sixty-one petitioners
in the sample is provided in table 6.*
*Note: This may be an appropriate place to pose some
questions to the reader that are outside the scope of
this article, but arise out of its findings. First, w hy are
so many people w ith m onthly incomes of $400 or less
able to obtain credit from as many as tw enty sources,
totaling on the average about $6,000? N ext, is avail
able credit information being used by Missoula area
businessmen? And finally, is the existing credit con-

Number
of Cases
____ 9
_ 26
_____ 18
____ 5
_____ 3
___ 0
_____ 61

Percent
14.8
42.6
29.5
8.2
4.9
0.0
100.0

in oraer xo obtain comparable data tor the
clients of the Missoula Credit Counseling Serv
ice, a sample comprised of 95 active cases was
taken from their program files. The sample
shows that on the average, the clients of the
counseling service had debt problems less severe
than those of the bankrupts sampled. They had
both smaller debts and fewer creditors. A much
greater percentage of the counseling service’s
clients had debts under $6,000 than was true for
the bankrupts who were sampled. Also, a con
siderably smaller percentage of the clients had
debts totaling $10,000 or more. Their mean debt
was $4,237. The median was $3,653. These com
pare respectively to the $6,786 and $5,470 figures
for the bankrupts. Table 7 shows the percent
ages of clients sampled that fall into each of the
debt categories. For ease of comparison, the re
spective percentages for the sample of bank
rupts are also shown.
Table 7
Clients of the Consumer Credit Counseling Service
of Missoula— Amount of D ebt in Cases Sampled
Total
Number
Liabilities
of Cases
$
0-1,999 _ ___16
2,000-3,999 ..
... 39
4,000-5,999 ..
... 22
6,000-7,999 ...... ... 10
8,000-9,999 ______ 6
10,000 and over ...... 2
Total
...... 95
Mean: $4,237
Median: $3,653
*Error due to roundirig-

Percent
16.8
41.1
23.2
10.1
6.3
2.2
99.7*

Percent of
Bankruj
1.6
24.6
32.8
13.1
4.9
23.0
100.0

trol information adequate, or do w e need a more ef
fective credit reporting service?
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The average client of the counseling service
also had considerably fewer creditors as com
pared to the average from the sample of bank
rupts. Their mean number of creditors was 14.
The median was 13. The sample of bankrupts,
on the other hand, had a mean of 25 and a
median of 22. Table 8 breaks down the sample
of clients according to the number of creditors
each had. Again, the respective figures derived
from the sample of bankrupts are also shown.
In addition to having smaller debts on the
average and fewer creditors, the clients of the
counseling service also had average monthly inTable 8
Creditors of the Missoula Consumer Credit
Counseling Service’s Clients
Number of
Number
Creditors
of Cases
0- 9 ____
1 22
10-19 ..
... 57
20-29 ___
_ 16
30-39 ..
_
0
40-49 ..
__ 0
50 and over _
0
Total ... ... 95
Mean: 14
Median: 13
♦Error due to rounding.

Percent
23.2
60.0
16.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

Percent of
Bankrupts
4.9
34.4
34.4
9.8
11.5
4.9
99.9*

comes considerably higher than those of the
bankrupts. The mean and median incomes for
the clients sampled were $476 and $450 respec
tively, as compared to $374 and $354 for the
sample of bankrupts. As with the bankrupts,
the clients of the counseling service may have'
been motivated to understate their incomes. By
doing so a client might succeed in maintaining
some discretionary income should the counselor
place him on a tightly budgeted repayment pro
gram. The forms that the counselor completes
for each of the service’s clients specify that the
income recorded is to be a net figure. But on
some of the bankruptcy petitions, some of the
petitioners stated a gross figure. So there is not
perfect comparability between the two sets of
data. However, in view of the size of the in
comes involved, any distortion caused by the
differences between gross and net income in
some of the cases sampled should not be enough
to invalidate the results of the analysis. Table 9
displays the number and percentage of clients
who fall into the established income categories.

Also shown are the percentage figures from the
sample of bankrupts. About the same percent
age of cases in each sample had incomes under
$600. But a much larger percentage of the bank
rupts fall in the under $400 category.
Table 9
Average Monthly Income of the Clients Sampled at the
Time They Initiated a Repayment Program
Average
Monthly
Number
Income
of Cases
$
0-199 ... __ 1
200-399 ... __ 23
400-599 ...
__ 54
600-799 ...
_ - 14
800-999 ...
2
1,000 and over
1
Total ..
... 95
Mean: $476
Median: $450

Percent
1.1
24.2
56.8
14.7
2.1
1.1
100.0

Percent of
Bankrupts
14.8
42.6
29.5
8.2
4.9
0.0
100.0

The information drawn from these samples is
not startling. The bankrupts sampled could be
expected to have more serious debt problems
and smaller incomes than the clients of the
credit counseling service. The counseling service
can be of no direct assistance to severely in
debted individuals or debtors who have no
margin of income over and above necessary ex
penses with which they could attempt to repay
their creditors. And the sample taken from the
case files of the counseling service included only
those individuals who had actually been placed
on repayment programs. Also, studies have
shown that during the months immediately pre
ceding the filing of bankruptcy an individual
not only continues to accumulate debt but ac
cumulates it at an increasingly faster rate.10
The clients of the counseling service, on the
other hand, are prohibited from accumulating
additional debt once they have been placed on
a repayment program.
However, if the bankruptcy cases sampled are
not averaged, but considered separately in terms
o the amount of debt involved in each case as it
relates to the petitioner’s income at the time the
p er P ^ Phm ,
rw«°™a , a^ tors
nnmi/*l°T?a
TT f sear.ch
State University,
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Jr., An Analysis of Economic and
Leading to Consumer Bankruptcy—■
^ °- *5>Bureau of Business and Eco(East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan
1965), p. 95.
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petition was filed, how many of these individ
uals actually had the capacity to repay their
creditors? To answer this question an examina
tion of the repayment schedules designed for the
clients of the counseling service sampled is re
quired. Both the percentage of income contrib
uted towards the repayment of creditors each
month and the number of months over which
the repayment program is to operate can be de
rived from these schedules. This information
can then be related to the data obtained from
the sample of bankrupts in an attempt to evalu
ate their repayment capacity.
The size of the monthly contribution made by
clients of the counseling service toward the
liquidation of their debt varied from 13 to 63
percent of their monthly net incomes. Both the
mean and median for the sample were 30 per
cent. In table 10 a breakdown of the sample is
presented according to the percentage of month
ly income disbursed to creditors in each case.
The size of the monthly contribution a debtor
can make as payment to his creditors is deter
mined by the size of his income in excess of his
expenses for necessities. As a result, any factor
which can influence either the size of his income
or the amount of his expenditures becomes sig
nificant. Such factors as changes in employ
ment, number of dependents, or the presence of
large medical bills are obvious. For the pur
poses of this analysis, factors of this type are
Table 10
Monthly Contribution to Creditors as a Percentage
of M onthly Net Income
Percent of
Number
Monthly Income
of Cases
0- 9 ............
____ 0
10-19 ...
... 13
20-29 ...
... 34
30-39 _________ ..... 34
40-49 ...
... 10
50 and over ...
. 4
Total ...
... 95

Percent
0.0
13.7
35.8
35.8
10.5
4.2
100.0

considered as unknowns because of a lack of
information. Therefore, in attempting to relate
the data concerning the repayment of creditors
by clients of the counseling service to the data
from the sample of bankrupts, absolute numeri
cal values cannot be justified. Rather, a range
of values must be specified.
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The one variable that can be taken into ac
count in specifying this range of percentages is
the size of a client’s income as stated on the
counseling service forms. As might be expected,
when the percentage of income repaid to cred
itors each month by the higher-income clients
was compared with the percentage paid by cli
ents in the lower-income group, it was found
that those with higher incomes were able to con
tribute more.
Thus, in order to insure that the percentages
used are not overly optimistic, the lower-income
half of the cases sampled will be used in speci
fying the range to be applied to the data derived
from the bankruptcy sample. In fact, the aver
age income in the bankruptcy sample is approxi
mately the same as that for the lower-income
half of the client sample. Over 80 percent of the
individuals in the lower half of the sample con
tributed between 15 and 35 percent of their
monthly incomes to the repayment of their
debts. This will be the range to be utilized.
One other factor should be specified before
proceeding, and that is the number of months it
is feasible for a repayment program to operate.
Over 86 percent of the counseling service pro
grams were designed to liquidate a client’s debt
in 42 months or less. A program of much greater
length has a greater chance of failure and is dis
couraged.11 For similar reasons, the Bankruptcy
Act sets a three-year limit on repayment pro
grams initiated under Chapter XIII. A 42-month
time constraint, therefore, is reasonable in judg
ing whether a repayment program is likely to
succeed.
It is now possible to attempt an answer to the
question posed earlier. How many of the bank
rupts sampled actually had the capacity to repay
their debts? If a bankrupt’s average monthly
income is multiplied by a percentage figure rep
resenting that portion of his income he is able to
set aside each month for the repayment of his
creditors, and the resulting amount is divided
into his total debt, the number of months it
would take to repay his debt can be calculated.
This has been done three times for each of the
cases sampled: once assuming 15 percent of the
bankrupt’s income is applied to the repayment
of his debt, a second time assuming 25 percent
“Earl Slack (counselor), interview held at the office of
the Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Missoula,
October 1971.
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of his income is set aside for this purpose, and a
third time assuming 35 percent is set aside. Sub
ject to the 42-month time constraint regarding
the duration of a repayment program, it was
found that from 7 percent to nearly 48 percent
of the bankrupts sampled did have the capacity
to repay all of their debts. The 7 percent figure
represents a conservative estimate. The 48 per
cent figure is rather optimistic. If a midpoint
figure of 25 percent is applied, about one-third
of the bankrupts could have eliminated their
debts within a period of three and one-half
years.
These results are much like those obtained in
a number of other studies. Robert Dolphin
found in a study of bankrupts in the Flint, Mich
igan, area that, allowing for an adequate stand
ard of living in one case and a comfortable level
in another case, between 28 and 49 percent of
the bankrupts could have repaid their debts in
full within three years.12 And similarly, in a
study of personal bankrupts in Seattle, Wash
ington, John Brosky estimates that between 18
and 56 percent of the cases he sampled had the
capacity to solve their debt problems through
means other than bankruptcy.13 Although there
are differences between the methodologies em
ployed in these studies and that used in this
paper, and differences in the characteristics of
the populations sampled, the findings of these
studies reinforce the results of this analysis.
It has been shown that a considerable per
centage of the bankrupts sampled had the ca
pacity for repaying their creditors. Of course,
having the capacity for repayment and having
the desire to do so and/or the knowledge of how
to attempt it are not the same. But it can be
estimated that about one-third of those filing
bankruptcy in Missoula during this period would
have been strong prospects for a repayment
program supervised by the counseling service,
which would have enabled them to satisfy all of
their debt obligations. And for another 15 per
cent of these cases, such a repayment program
may have been worth considering.
"Dolphin, An Analysis of Economic and Personal Fac
tors Leading to Consumer Bankruptcy—Occasional
Paper No. 15, p. 107.
“John J. Brosky, A Study of Personal Bankruptcy in
the Seattle Metropolitan Area (Seattle, Washington:
The Retail Creditors Association of Seattle, 1965) p

Thus, although the counseling service has had
an important impact on Missoula’s economy, its
programs have the potential for much greater
impact. Futhermore, many of the bankrupts
sampled, who lacked the capacity to pay their
creditors at the time they filed their petitions,
may have been able to avoid that alternative
had they been given proper guidance while their
debt problems were less severe.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Three fundamental conclusions can be made
on the basis of this study. The first is that from
a strictly economic point of view, bankruptcy
does not afford an adequate solution in many
cases to the problem of personal over-indebted
ness in the Missoula area. The losses to Missoula
creditors resulting from bankruptcy have been
shown to be substantial. And in a considerable
number of cases an individual turning to bank
ruptcy is not limited to this course of action as
the sole alternative to his financial problems.
The second conclusion is that the Consumer
Credit Counseling Service of Missoula has had
an important impact on the area’s economy since
its operations began in 1966. It has been a major
factor in reducing bankruptcies in Missoula
County, which in turn has meant a savings to
creditors in the community. In addition, its pro
grams provide a mechanism by which clients of
the service can make steady monthly payments
toward the liquidation of their debts.
The third conclusion is that although its im
pact. has been important during the past six
years, the potential exists for the counseling
service to have a much greater impact on Mis
soula’s economy. Up to one-third of the indi
viduals filing for bankruptcy in Missoula County
might have had a good chance of success if
placed on a repayment program supervised by
the counseling service. In another 15 percent of
the cases, the debtor might have had some
chance of success with such a program. Also,
these figures likely understate the true potential
impact of the counseling service, because many
of the bankrupts who do not have the ability to
repay their debts at the time they file for bank
ruptcy might have been able to do so had they
received special guidance at an earlier stage.
Ajiy recommendations to be made on the basis
of this study stem from the third conclusion. To
deal more effectively with the immediate prob-
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lem of reducing the number of bankruptcies in
the country, a much greater effort to inform the
public of the programs offered by the counsel
ing service is necessary. Many people in serious
need of counseling regarding their debt prob
lems have no knowledge of either the availa
bility of the counseling service or the type of
assistance it can provide.
However, it is also conceivable that some indi
viduals have failed to avail themselves of the
counseling service simply because they lack the
desire to attempt the repayment of their debts.
This is a problem which cannot be dealt with
effectively on the local level. To deny a retreat
into bankruptcy to those who have the ability
to repay their debts but lack the desire to do so
would require an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act. This implies that efforts to encourage
debtors of this type to participate in a repay
ment program administered by a consumer
credit counseling service should be focused pri
marily at the national level.
Although reducing the number of bankrupt
cies in the county is important, bankruptcy itself
is only the most visible aspect of the much more
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widespread problem of excessive debt. In the
long run, the counseling service should provide
a full range of services, from educational and
counseling programs aimed at preventing per
sonal debt problems to remedial programs to
actually assist a debtor in repaying his creditors.
The counseling service cannot hope to carry this
burden alone. It should attempt to stimulate
schools, labor groups, and other concerned or
ganizations to help in developing and operating
this wide range of programs.
A single, broadly stated recommendation can
therefore be made on the basis of this study: the
operations of the Consumer Credit Counseling
Service of Missoula should be expanded to en
able it to fulfill its potentially greater role in
the Missoula community. Its efforts to provide
remedial and rehabilitative programs to help
families with serious debt problems should be
intensified, and new educational and counseling
programs aimed at preventing such problems
should be developed. This would, of course,
mean increased support, financial and otherwise.
But that decision is up to the community.

Winter 1972

ROBERT BIGART

Hutterites in Montana
The impact of communal
farming groups on the
Montana economy
Much economic theory depends upon the as
sumption that people are rational. In a marketoriented economy such as ours, individuals are
generally assumed to act in rational ways to
maximize their personal satisfaction, which in
turn is usually equated with maximizing real
income. This approach has proved useful in ex
plaining most observed behavior; the real world,
however, includes numerous social and religious
forces which work counter to this simplified
concept of economic motivation. The theocratic
communities of the Montana Hutterites, for ex
ample, are functioning groups which make
HUTTERITE COLONIES IN MONTANA

many of their major economic decisions with
noneconomic criteria.
The 1,761 Hutterites in the central and north
central part of the state have religious roots
which go back to the Reformation in the 17th
century. Their most distinctive religious doc
trines require communality of colony life, rigor
ous avoidance of the outside world, and total
nonresistance. Their other doctrines are similar
to traditional conservative Christianity. Cen
turies ago, severe persecution forced them to
move about in Central Europe with dwindling
numbers until 1770 when a small group man
aged to emigrate to the Ukraine.

Discrimination Against Hutterite
Communities

Each circle is one colony.
Source: Victor Peters, A ll Things Common: The H utterum W ay of L ife (University of Minnesota Press,

In the 1870s, rising Russian nationalism forced
the group to move again, this time to the United
States, where they established successful agri
cultural communities on the unsettled South
Dakota prairie. Government pressure on the
Hutterites to fight in the First World War
forced the groups to move to Canada, where
welcomed at first. During the Second
World War and early 1950s, however, the Cana lan provinces passed laws seriously restrainf?e exPansi°n of the communities. Since
that tune many new colonies have been estabis e in Montana. The communities are agri-
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cultural and aim to be as self-supporting as
possible.
After their arrival in Montana, agitation
against the Hutterite communities increased.
In 1948 Joseph Kinsey Howard reported:
Montana newspaper editorials have begun to
reflect the uneasiness of their new neighbors,
and demand for state legislation to check fur
ther settlem ent by them has started.1

Opposition was usually justified on grounds of
national loyalty, but others have maintained
that the real objection is economic. One Can
adian official has stated that the dislike resulted
from the Hutterites being “such good farmers,
that others can’t compete.”2 The fear that a
colony located in an area would cause neighbor
ing land values to drop has also caused resent
ment, and local tradesmen seemed to feel the
communities would cause a net loss of business.8
In addition, a question has arisen over taxes,
since as religious groups they might be expected
to operate tax free. But the Hutterites pay taxes
despite their status as religious organizations.
Exactly which taxes they pay depends on how a
specific colony is organized.4 In 1962, the 97member Milford Colony in Lewis and Clark
County, paid $4,300 in Montana corporation li
cense fees, $5,663 for property taxes to local
government, and $3,107 for federal corporation
taxes.5 The Hutterite colonies usually pay more
taxes than the previous owners of their land
because their intensive cultivation increases the
taxable value of the property. With develop
ment only beginning, the Milford Colony in
creased the value of the improvements on their
property from $9,000 to $30,000 in one year.6
Victor Peters found that with regard to the
Canadian colonies, the most prejudiced people*
'Joseph Kinsey Howard, “Hutterites: Puzzle for Pa
triots,” The Pacific Spectator (W inter 1948), Vol. 2,
No. 1, p. 40.
*Victor Peters, A ll Things Common: The Hutterian
Way of L ife (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1965), p. 65.
“Kenneth C. Thomas, “A Survey of the Hutterite
Groups in Montana and Canada” (Unpublished M.A.
^thesis, Missoula: University of Montana, 1949), p. 60.
‘“Hutterite Farm Groups Facing Inquiry by Montana
Legislature,” N ew Y ork Times, June 2, 1963; and Ken
neth C. Thomas, “A Survey of the Hutterite Groups
in Montana and Canada,” p. 61.
“Internal Revenue Service (District Office personal
communication, Helena, Montana).
“Howard, “Hutterites: Puzzle for Patriots,” pp. 40-41.
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toward the Hutterities were usually those who
had the fewest contacts with them. Colony re
lations with immediate neighbors were such
that Peters reported “no colony is surrounded
by hostility.”7
Economic discrimination practiced by Mon
tanans, according to available reports, has taken
the form of reluctance to do business with Hut
terite colonies. This is especially important in
land transactions. The colonies have had to pay
higher-than-market prices for land in order to
overcome the hesitancy of the sellers to offend
their neighbors.8 Since it is very rare for Hut
terites to complain about prejudice they can live
with, only one reference to discrimination in
everyday business dealings was found. John
Wurz, head of a colony near Lethbridge, Al
berta, noted, “we buy goods in the local mar
kets, we pay without haggling—prices often
higher than other people pay for the same lands
and goods.”9
No law has yet been passed in Montana to
restrict the Hutterite colonies, though the early
sixties saw repeated attempts to do so. In the
1961 and 1963 legislative sessions, bills were
killed that would have restricted land purchases
by the colonies. The 1963 session did create a
legislative committee to report on the situation
of the Hutterites in Montana. A measure to pay
the expenses of the committee was defeated.
Several hearings were held in 1964 and a report
was made to the 1965 session of the legislature.
The only misconduct by the Hutterites reported
by the committee was the purchase by individ
uals of state lands for colony use, allegedly to
circumvent limits on how much state land can
be purchased by a single person. When the re
port was submitted in 1965, the committee was
attacked by the Montana Council of Churches as
“high handed and biased.”10 Since 1965, the Hut
terites have not been a live political issue in
Montana.
’Peters, A ll Things Common: The H utterian W ay of
Life, p. 181.
“Howard, “Hutterites: Puzzle for Patriots,” p. 40.
““Hutterite Head Explains Work, Viewpoint of Colony
in Interview w ith Publisher of Pioneer Press,” L ew istow n D aily N ews, August 1, 1950.
“ “Senate Kills B ill Aimed at Hutterite Expansion,”
G reat Falls Tribune, February 28, 1961; “Hutterite
Farm Groups Facing Inquiry,” N ew Y o rk Times, June
2, 1963; “Study of the Hutterite Opens,” G reat Falls
Tribune, January 30, 1964; “Operation of Hutterite
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The recent educational problems of the Hutterites in Montana seem to have been limited
mainly to a 1958 controversy over whether the
children of the Ayers and Deerfield Colonies
(located in Fergus County) would continue in
school past eighth grade. The state enforced the
1955 law requiring that children attend school
until their sixteenth birthday, but compliance
does not seem to have had any long-range effect
on the colonies.11*

Colony Life
Hutterite colony life appears to be socially
satisfying. The contentment shown by colony
members has impressed most observers. Joseph
Kinsey Howard noted this in 1948 when he men
tioned:
Visitors to a bruderhof are struck most force
fully by the apparent happiness of the colo
nists, though they have no entertainment or
recreation of any kind except what may be
drawn from conversation.15

A1 Funderburke, a Billings Gazette reporter
noted more recently:
Hutterites are unprofessionally happy in their
way of life. Smiles are evident everywhere
Towheaded youngsters cling to their parents
with evident affection, smiling shyly at visi
tors. Faces are open and friendly.15

This contentment with colony life seems quite
closely tied to the frequent and satisfying social
interactions within the community. Victor
Peters noted that the most common form of rec
reation in the colonies was visiting after work
on weekdays and on Sunday. Bertha Clark also
noted the Hutterite conversational skill and
pointed out that work is usually done in
groups.14 She describes the work activities of
the women as follows:
Colonies Told at Legislative Fact Finding Session”
Great Falls Tribune, February 8, 1964; “Communal
Society study Committee May Hold Second Meeting
m April,” Great Falls Tribune, March 10, 1964* “Hut
tei?,t e r r.°be Urged in ReP0rt»” Billings Gazette, JanuFalls Tribune, January 23, 1965.
16, 1965; “Hutterite Probe ‘High-Handed,’ ” Great
First Hutterite Adjudged Guilty in Truancy Cases ”
Lewistown Daily News, October 9, 1958.
“Howard, “Hutterites: Puzzle for Patriots ” p 36
UA1 Funderburke, “Hutterites Have Communal Exist°f Work and Prayer.” Billings Gazette, July
I9 6 0 .

A visitor driving into a community may see
one group of women stringing beans, another
group making rhubarb pies on a great table
under the trees, others knitting on benches
beside the houses, other spinning, and still
others plucking pigeons for the Chicago mar
ket.15

A team of psychologists studying the mental
health of the Hutterites noted a high level of
psychological adjustment which they traced to
the group’s system of mutual aid and the sup
port and love demonstrated by the community
at the first sign of depression or other mental
stress.16 John Hostetler has shown how growing
up in a Hutterite colony encourages one to de
velop that pattern of values and expectations
which the colony can best satisfy in its adult
members.17*
Avoidance of modern conveniences has not
hindered the Hutterites in mechanizing their
agricultural operations. When a colony pur
chases land it usually uses more mechanized
cultivation than the previous owners. A new
colony near Augusta in Lewis and Clark County
bought a ranch that previously raised only feed
crops and in 1947, the first year, broke over 1,200
acres for wheat, barley, oats, potatoes, and a
; ^ o , garden-18 A visitor to another colony in
1948 found that:
In most colonies there are to be found diesel
caterpillar tractors, modern tillers, seeders and
other cultivating machinery. Most of the colo
nies also have w ell equipped repair shops for
this equipm ent”

A research team in the early 1950s observed that
otten the colonies have the most modem equip
ment in the neighborhood.20
In a recent book on Hutterian groups in Can
ada, John W. Bennett demonstrated that the increased diversification allowed by colony labor
15Ib id ., p . 370.

C°“

ities” Journal 01

H e a lt h o f th ^ w ^ ^
Robert J- Weil, “The Mental
th ? Uttentes- Scientific American, vol. 189,
no. 6 (December 1953), pp. 36-37
teritp ^ ^ ° S!etler; ^otal. Socialization: Modem HutRevipm vr,?a 4?nal Practices»” Mennonite Quarterly
2£w
; 4V ° - \ (January 1970), pp. 72-84.
M onths»»
Build Community in Six
f u nmh ’ <S reat Falls Tribune, May 25, 1947.
Canada ” p 3gVey °f Hutterite Groups in Montana and
«TheP:H , ^ Ef ° nVirRObert J * Wei1’ and Bert Kaplan,
0 Uf l r / , ^ ttp teS Mental Health Study,” Mennonite
Quarterly R eview (January 1951).
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resources resulted in a much more stable income
than a comparable family farm organization.21
The local Canadian individually owned farms
were dependent on a single commodity—wheat.
Consequently, their income fluctuated drama
tically as wheat prices moved up or down. For
the Hutterite colony, poultry products and other
produce were additional major income sources,
and thus their income was not tied to the price
level of any one commodity. Bennett also found
that per acre returns were higher for the colony
than for the individual farm, because the in
dividual farmer had a seriously restricted labor
supply which resulted in his operation being
more capital intensive than production effici
ency would recommend. The colony, on the
other hand, had a more adequate labor supply
which did not require capital outlay in the form
of wages.22

Nonrational Behavior
by Religious Communities
Hutterite colonies have been very successful
in limiting the allure of outside economic oppor
tunities on their members. It is very rare in
normal times for anyone of middle age or over
to leave the community. Despite the Hutterite
conviction that their young people are being
“lost” to the world, desertion of the colony, even
by members of the younger age groups, is rare
and such separations are usually only tempor
ary. Although no figures are available, the re
ligious communities seem to hold more of their
young people than do most other agricultural
communities in Montana. This is accomplished
through a religious indoctrination program that
begins in nursery school at age two and a half
and by strenuous efforts to isolate the commu
nity from worldly temptations.
The Hutterite children, for example, drop out
of school as early as is legally possible—ending
contact with even this limited measure of out
side influence. For fear of worldly influence,
Hutterites rarely send their young people to col
lege. The colonies are usually physically iso
lated and economically almost self-sufficient.
“John W. Bennett, H utterian Brethren: The A gricul
tural Economy and Social O rganization of a Communal
People (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1967).
"Ibid., pp. 230-33.
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The flow of labor resources in and out of the
community is negligible compared to the free
flow envisaged in the orthodox theory of mar
ket economy.28
The effectiveness of the control of the church
over its members is illustrated by an incident
cited by Victor Peters, of a teacher who brought
a television set into a colony. Most of the com
munity visited the teacherage with its televi
sion set at least once during the year but the
teacher noted:
A noticeable decrease in the number of visits
to the teacherage w as observed toward the end
of the year and (th is) writer assumed that
Hutterian beliefs and indoctrination held firm
and won the battle over “the devil’s own in
strument of tem ptation.”*4

Capital accumulated by the colonies is not in
vested for maximum return, but is usually
invested in land and equipment for new com
munities. Religious ideals, in this case, rather
than the pure profit motive, determine alloca
tion of capital.
Another instance of the unresponsiveness of
the members of these religious communities to
economic inducements is that maximum per
sonal satisfaction for them does not require or
even allow the maximum level of consumption.
By the standards of most Americans, they make
an effort to underconsume. As a result, the
colony members do not need to work at their
maximum pace to satisfy consumer demands.
Victor Peters, for example, quoted Samuel
Kleinsasser of Winnipeg, a former colony mem
ber, as saying, “I work a lot harder here than I
ever did on the colony.”25 Bertha Clark also
noted in her study of the Hutterites that “idle
ness and overwork are two extremes which
Hutterian people know little of.” Capital accu
mulates rapidly in the colony, though, because
the generally efficient operations are combined
with the fact that relatively few resources are
used for personal consumption.
Nationally, the population of the colonies is
“Howard, “Hutterites: Puzzle for Patriots,” p. 39;
Peters, A ll Things Common: The H utterian W ay of
Life, pp. 128, 135, 162-64; Clark, “Hutterian Commu
nities,” pp. 360, 484; Thomas, “Survey of Hutterite
Groups in Montana and Canada,” p. 33.
“Peters, A ll Things Common: The H utterian W ay of
Life, p. 137.
*Ibid., pp. 103-104.
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skyrocketing. In the 1940s, the Hutterites had a
birth rate almost twice that of the United
States, with only half the American death rate:

Population
Hutterians
United States

Period
1946-50
1949-51

Birth
Rate
per 1,000
45.9
24.0

Death
Rate
Rate of
per 1,000 Increase
4.4
41.5
9.7
14.3

Total population of religious communities in
Montana is so small, however, that a rapid
growth rate has had little effect upon the state
as a whole.26

Effects of Colonies on
Montana Economic Growth
Despite the generous economic success of the
religious colonies, they avoid making maximum
use of their resources. If the communities were
to invest their capital and transfer their men
without consideration of religious principle,
they could receive a higher rate of return. Even
with this limitation, they have been more suc
cessful than most private farmers.27
As mentioned above, neither capital nor labor
are used to get the highest return for the colony.
Religious principles of communalism take pre
cedence. This has resulted in a situation where
communal land is much more intensely worked
than other farm land, and, because the rate of
return decreases, the rewards for the additional
investment are probably considerably less than
they would be if the funds were invested else
where.
The low consumption level of the communi
ties is the only way their peculiar economic con
duct costs outsiders potential profits. Through
the multiplier effect from the increased spend
ing in the community, a higher level of con
sumption for the Hutterites would probably
benefit some of their neighbors, particularly
merchants. How much better off, if any, the
neighbors would be if the colony land were
owned by others remains to be demonstrated.
“There are only about 5,000 Hutterites in the entire
United States. Robert C. Cook, “North American Hut
terites,” Population Bulletin, vol. 10 (October 1954),
pp. 3, 97-107; and Peters, A ll Things Common: The
H utterian W ay of Life, p. 152.
“Cook, “North American Hutterites,” p. 119.

The low level of consumption is probably
largely offset by the additional purchases of
materials needed for intensive cultivation of the
land and for supplying the larger population
the colonies bring to an area.
The Hutterite per capita acreage in Manitoba
was found by Peters to be thirty-five acres—
meaning a given acreage can support consider
ably more Hutterites than outsiders.28 For ex
ample, the Thomas survey of Hutterite groups
in Montana and Canada in 1948 found one
colony near Lewistown to be spending five to
six thousand dollars a year at a local supermar
ket for food they could not produce. A 1963
article in the Mennonite Quarterly Review re
ported that most colonies do business with the
“outside world” in excess of $100,000 annually.29
A colony’s total spending in the outside econ
omy is probably higher than if the same land
were owned and worked by fewer farmers who
were not Hutterites.
This low level of per capita consumption al
lows for increased rates of capital accumulation,
as mentioned, with most of this money going for
more land. When a commune becomes overpopulated and new land must be purchased in
another area, the money leaves the community;
but most Hutterites prefer, when possible, to
locate new colonies in the same locality as the
older ones.
Effects of these economic practices on the
larger community or the state as a whole are
generally beneficial because the colonies usu
ally increase the productivity of the land they
work. Their inefficient use of capital does not
adversely affect the larger economy, since their
capital comes from within the Hutterite com
munity, not the larger economy. The lower re
turn on their capital hurts only themselves.
Religious communities are unusual and in
clude only a small proportion of the Montana
population, but, beyond what direct importance
they have, they serve to illustrate some of the
problems hindering efficient allocation of re
sources in much of rural Montana—noneco
nomic influences which lead to lack of mobility
for resources, and noneconomic goals that affect
spending patterns.
“Peters, A ll Things Common: The Hutterian W ay of
Life, p. 109.
“Eaton, Weil, and Kaplan, “The Hutterites Mental
Health Study,” p. 32.
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Hutterite Colonies in Montana, 1964
__
. _ ,
Name of Colony
1 K ing Ranch
2 Ayers
3 Spring Creek
4 D eerfield
5 Birch Creek
6 Millfort
7 N ew Rockport
8 Miami
9 Rockport
10 M iller Ranch
11 Glacier
12 H illside
13 Turner
14 Martinsdale
15 Springdale
16 W olf Creek
17 Sage Creek
18 Duncan Ranch
19 Rimrock
20 H illdale
21 Wilson Range
P r « Cei c J s f 0r
* *css, 19bo), pp. 207—
210.

Year
PopuM inister
Address
Founded
lation
Elias Walter
Lew istown
1935
50
John Stahl
Lew istow n
1945
55
P aul W alter
Lew istown
1945
51
P aul Stahl
Danvers
1947
52
Jacob Waldner
Valier
1947
79
Joseph K leinsasser
Augusta
1948
97
Peter Hofer
Choteau
1948
131
Issak Wurtz
Pendroy
1948
80
John K leinsasser
Pendroy
1948
78
David Hofer
Choteau
1949
98
Joseph Waldner
Cut Bank
1951
132
Andreas Wurtz
Sw eet Grass
1951
91
John Hofer
Turner
1957
75
John W ipf
Martinsdale
1959
93
P eter W ipf
W hite Sulphur
1959
97
Joseph Hofer
Harlem
1960
55
P aul W ipf
Chester
1961
106
John Entz
Tw o Dot
1963
81
Peter Hofer
Sunburst
1963
82
Joseph Waldner
Havre
1963
103
Elias W alter
Stanford
1963
75
Total = 21 colonies w ith 1,761 people.
™ " 0S Common; The H utterian W ay of L ife (Minneapolis: U niversity of Minnesota
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